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1 Introduction
In democratic countries economic decisions are made through the political process.
Electoral results do not often generate a majority, which makes coalition pol-
itics crucial. The coalition formation and the bargaining inside the coalition
directly inuence a policy decision, given the election results. Who holds the
government positions is one of the most important predictors of what policies
will be adopted. In addition, expectations regarding potential future coalitions
have an inuence on the voterschoice at the election stage.
The existing literature on bargaining in legislatures and coalition formation
is abundant. Most of the studies generally assume that if decision makers do
not reach a decision, it is postponed until the next period and a certain default
policy is implemented. Two kinds of a default policy are generally considered:
the policy that gives exogenous benets to all decision makers or a stochastic
default policy. However, the policy decisions usually have a prolonged e¤ect
and become the default policies in future legislations. Nevertheless, there exist
only a few attempts to introduce an endogenous default policy in bargaining
problems. The rst three chapters of my dissertation consider the endogenous
default policy. By the endogenous default policy I shall basically mean the
situation when the default policy in the absence of a decision is determined by
the policy last implemented.
Furthermore, my dissertation considers the coalition size. Minimal winning
coalitions (MWC) have appeared as a key prediction of various models of coali-
tion formation and vote buying where the MWC is dened as the cheapest
coalition which induces the acceptance. But as an empirical matter, super-
majority coalitions appear at least as prevalent as minimal winning coalitions.
I investigate conditions under which the MWC and supermajority coalitions
emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
Chapter 1 incorporates an endogenous default policy into the distribution
model of legislative bargaining. For more than three risk neutral players, the
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium yields a minimum winning coalition under
congressional and parliamentary systems. The resulting equilibrium allocation
will be generally more unequal than with the exogenous default policy.
In Chapter 2 the endogenous and exogenous default policy rules are com-
pared in the distribution model of legislative bargaining. If the initial default
policy is symmetric, players are indi¤erent between the two rules. Players with
a relatively high initial default payo¤ always support the endogenous default
policy, which leads to an extreme allocation and cycling majorities. Players in
the middlesupport the exogenous system, because they are always included
into the coalition. Players with relative low initial default payo¤ favor the en-
dogenous rule, if their default payo¤ is extremely low, and prefer the exogenous
rule otherwise. If I allow for negative payments, players with an extremely low
default payo¤ may change their preferences and support the exogenous system,
which guarantees more stability. Moreover, if players decide about a policy rule
by a simple majority voting, both rules can be chosen, depending on the initial
allocation.
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As shown in Chapter 1, an endogenous default policy in the divide the
dollar game leads to an extreme allocation when politicians are risk neutral.
In Chapter 3 I show that if voters prefer more stability in the allocation, they
can inuence politicians via elections. This chapter shows that a symmetric
allocation is obtained for a high enough discount rate if voters can reelect all
politicians. If voters can elect only the agenda setter, only limited stability can
be achieved. Maximal outcome stability requires political stability. Limited
political competition can be introduced at the cost of the outcome stability.
Chapter 4 studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An
outside party o¤ers private transfers to members of a committee in order to
inuence its decision. The willingness to accept such transfers is private infor-
mation. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces truth-
telling equilibrium and secures the implementation of the decision, desirable by
an outside party, for a price close to the minimal winning coalition price.
2 Endogenous default policy in political games
2.1 Introduction
Most of the existing literature on bargaining in legislatures and coalition for-
mation generally assumes that when decision makers do not reach a decision, it
is postponed till the next period and a certain default policy is implemented.
Two kinds of a default policy are generally considered: the policy that gives
symmetric constant benets to all decision makers or a stochastic default pol-
icy. This paper considers the endogenous default policy: the default policy in
the absence of a decision is determined by the policy last implemented.
One example of a model in which a constant default policy is applied is
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000). There the default policies are constant
and give the same utility to all participants in a complex framework that includes
taxation, redistribution and public good decisions as well as elections.
Classical examples of decision postponing in the distribution problem with
a symmetric zero default policy can be found in Rubinstein (1982) and Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) articles. The decision process is characterized by an innite
horizon where a single proposal is made in each period and is either accepted,
terminating the process, or rejected, moving the decision process to the next
period. An additional example is presented in Diermeier and Feddersen (1998),
where the authors investigate the inuence of the voice of condence procedure
on the decision making process.
The stochastic default policy is considered by Diermeier and Merlo (2000).
In a two period model of government formation and termination, a policy shock
determines the default policy that will be implemented if no government is
formed during that period.
There are few attempts to introduce an endogenous default policy in bar-
gaining problems. Baron (1996) considers a dynamic problem of collective goods
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programs, where the players have di¤erent preferences regarding the amount of
the public good characterized by a one-dimensional ideal point. Baron shows
that when the default policy is the decision from the previous period, the amount
of the public good converges to the median politicians ideal point. Baron and
Diermeier (1998) also use an endogenous default policy in a two period model
that incorporates elections, governmental formation and legislative bargaining
in a two-dimensional spatial environment.
Shepsle and Weingast (1984) investigate strategic voting and agenda setting
in a dynamic framework and in the contest of amendment agendas. Di¤ering
from the current study, they assume that there is a nal number of voting rounds
and that players are interested only in the nal result.
The current paper investigates a classical divide the cake-problem with
the endogenous default policy as introduced above. Politicians have to decide
how to divide an exogenously given budget under two alternative systems: the
parliamentary and the congressional. As in Helpman and Persson (2001), I
dene the political systems in the following way: under the congressional system,
an agenda setter is chosen randomly in each period and proposes a budget
allocation to the congress. The proposal is accepted and implemented if the
majority supports it; otherwise the default policy is implemented. Under the
parliamentary system a randomly chosen agenda setter has to obtain the support
of a randomly chosen coalition.
This modeling of the systems is a simplied way to reect the following dif-
ference between them: under the congressional system the legislative cohesion
is relatively low. The direct election of an executive makes it unnecessary to
form a stable majority to support the cabinet, nothing then limits the variety
of coalitions that can be formed. Such a regime captures some of the features of
the presidential-congressional regime, like that of the US. On the contrary, the
government survival plays a crucial role in the formation of a stable parliamen-
tary majority and the legislative cohesion emerges as an endogenous outcome
under the parliamentary system,. The assumption of the model reects the case
when each coalition partner has a veto right. The veto can be thought of as a
vote of condence on the government.
The main results of the paper are the following: when politicians are risk
neutral the equilibrium under both systems is characterized by a minimal win-
ning coalition strategy. This result is proved for a two period game as well as
for an innite horizon game.
I show that under the congressional system such an equilibrium does no
longer exist for a two period game when the politicians are su¢ ciently risk
averse. The equilibrium is characterized by risk sharing allocations and the
degree of risk sharing depends on the number of politicians and the level of risk
aversion. In the parliamentary system the equilibrium strategy is characterized
by a minimal winning coalition independently of the playersrisk attitudes.
In the simultaneous research Kalandrakis (2002, 2004) investigates an innite
game under what I call a congressional system. He obtains the same result as
in the current paper for a more general utility function, but he uses a more
complex proof.
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The paper is structured in the following way: the next section describes
the model. Section 2.3 considers myopic players. Section 2.4 presents a two
period game under the assumption of risk neutrality. The section considers
both systems: the congressional and the parliamentary system. Section 2.5
presents an innite horizon version of the same game. Section 2.6 considers risk
aversion in the two period framework. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
The political system consists out of the set of players N = f1; :::; ng where n  3
and odd. Each period politicians are to allocate a unit of a perfectly divisible
cake among themselves. Let X denote the set of feasible allocations in each
period, that is, X =

x 2 <n+ :
P
n
i=1x
i
t = 1
	
, where xit denotes the payo¤ of
player i at period t.
At this stage I assume that each player has a linear utility function that
depends on her payo¤ only. I also assume that the players discount the future
by a common discount factor  < 1. The preferences are separable over time,
so the utility function of player i is
Ui =
TX
t=1
t 1xit: (1)
The game is played as follows: each period nature randomly selects one
player to be the agenda setter. The agenda setter proposes an allocation in X,
and each player responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal.
Under the congressional system the decision rule in each period is a simple
majority rule. If at least n+12 members of the congress support proposal xt 2 X
in period t, it is implemented. Otherwise, the endogenous default policy is
implemented, which is the allocation in X that was implemented in the previous
period, namely xt 1 2 X. x0 2 X is the default policy in the rst period and
is given exogenously.
Following Helpman and Persson (2001), I assume that the parliamentary
system is characterized by nature choosing the agenda setter as well as coalition
members. I assume for simplicity that the size of an exogenously given coalition
is exactly the simple majority needed for a decision. If all coalition members
in period t support proposal xt, it is implemented. Otherwise, the endogenous
default policy, xt 1, is implemented. It would be more realistic to extend the
model to an initial government formation stage, when nature chooses the
agenda setter  the prime minister who afterwards proposes to some of the
politicians to form a coalition. But in the simple framework of this paper such
a game will be identical to the congressional regime game.
Let ht denote the past history (identity of previous agenda setters, proposals
they made, how each player voted for those proposals, allocations implemented
in each period) together with the identity of the current agenda setter. A feasible
action for player i at date t is denoted by ait (ht). When i is the agenda setter,
ait (ht) 2 X denotes the proposal o¤ered by i at date t, when the history is ht.
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When i is not the agenda setter, ait (ht) 2 faccept; rejectg denotes the decision
rule by i at date t. Strategy si for player i is a sequence of actions

ait (ht)
	T
t=1
,
and the strategy prole s is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player.
Whenever a player is to take an action, she knows which history has occurred,
the rules of the game and the preferences of the other players; so the game is of
perfect information.
The solution concept is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. I focus on a
particular class of equilibria called stationary. In such an equilibrium a player
chooses a history-independent strategy in each strategically identical sub-game.
In this model, all sub-games with the same default policy are strategically iden-
tical, since their action sets and the future sequences of moves are the same.
Thus, the equilibrium considered is a Markovor a state-spaceequilibrium
in which the past history inuences the current play only through its e¤ect on
a state variable that summarizes the direct e¤ect of the past on the current
environment. Alternatively, the strategies depend only on the payo¤-relevant
information. Then the equilibrium strategy prole can be dened as an n-tuple
of strategies si, that depend only on the actual default policy:

ait (xt 1)
	T
t=1
in
each period. Using this specic type of equilibrium I rule out a possible punish-
ment strategy prole which typically leads to a multiplicity of sub-game perfect
equilibria (see Baron and Ferejohn (1989)).
Since no player can change the outcome if a proposal is supported by more
than simple majority, I restrict attention to equilibria in which weakly domi-
nated strategies are eliminated. Otherwise any allocation can be supported as
an equilibrium.
2.3 Myopic case
As a benchmark case consider myopic players who maximize their current payo¤
in each period, without taking into consideration how their action will inuence
the future periods outcomes. This case also corresponds to the one period
game.
To begin with, I dene the minimal winning coalition (MWC) for myopic
(one period) game:
Denition 1 The agenda setter forms the MWC if any coalition member is
an element of MWC, where MWC  N is nonempty set which satises
i. jMWCj = n 12
ii. 8 j 2MWC xjt = min
nbxjt 2 xt ajt (xt 1; xt) = accepto
8 j =2MWC xjt = 0
iii. 8l 2MWC and 8k =2MWC : Pxjt
j2MWCnflg
+ xkt 
P
xjt
j2MWC
where xkt = min
bxkt 2 xt akt (xt 1; xt) = accept	
Thus, in each period the agenda setter chooses exactly n 12 coalition mem-
bers such that the sum of coalition payments, which induce the proposal accep-
tance, is minimal.
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The equilibrium strategy prole and payo¤s in the myopic case are charac-
terized as follows1 :
Proposition 1 a strategy prole is an equilibrium of myopic (one period)
game if it has the following form:
Let i 2 N denote the agenda setter
1. The decision rule for player j is as follows:
accept proposal xt i¤
xjt  xjt 1; 8 j 2 N; j 6= i
2. The agenda setter forms the MWC and coalition payo¤s are
xjt = x
j
t 1 8 j 2MWC
Proof. Given a proposal by player i, player j 2 MWC will accept if he is
at least as good as under the default policy2 . Since the agenda setters utility is
strictly increasing in her share, she proposes exactly xjt 1 to player j in order to
buy his vote. In order to get the proposal accepted, the agenda setter needs the
support of n 12 players. Thus, forming the MWC is equivalent to maximizing
the agenda setters current period utility.
Note, that the minimum value of the MWC proposal for the agenda setter
is always at least as high as her own default policy payo¤ :
xit = 1 
1  xit 1
n  1
n  1
2
=
1
2
+
xit 1
2

> xit 1 if x
i
t 1 < 1
= xit 1 if x
i
t 1 = 1
; (2)
where
1 xit 1
n 1 is the maximal payo¤ of a MWC member, which occurs when all
other players, apart from i, have an equal default policy. Therefore, the agenda
setter always proposes such an allocation that will be accepted.
Note that when the default policy is di¤erent among potential coalition
members, the agenda setter will always play a pure strategy and there is unique
equilibrium allocation. However, if there are several players with equal default
policies, then she is indi¤erent whom to include into the coalition and, for
simplicity, I assume that she includes them with equal probabilities.
2.4 Congressional system
2.4.1 Two period game
I start with considering the two periods version, T = 2, of a simple congressional
system, and investigate how an assumption of the endogenous default policy
inuences the results of legislature bargaining. The game is solved by backward
induction.
First result considers the second period of the game:
1As it is standard in the literature, I assume that a player supports the proposal whenever
he is indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting it.
2 I refer to the current agenda setter as sheand to other players as he
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Corollary 1 The equilibrium strategy prole in the second period is described
by Proposition 1.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.
Next, I dene the MWC strategy prole for the rst period:
Denition 2 The MWC strategy prole of the two period dynamic game
under congressional system is dened as follows: let i 2 N denote the agenda
setter in period 1.
1. For each player j the decision rule in period 1 is as follows:
accept proposal x1 i¤
xj1 + V
j
2 (x1)  xj0 + V j2 (x0) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; (3)
where V j2 (x) denotes the continuation value of player
j and is dened as the expected second period payo¤ when the default policy
vector in period two is x. The LHS is the expected utility of coalition member j
if he accepts proposal xj1, and RHS is his expected utility if he rejects it.
2. In period 1 the agenda setter forms the MWC and coalition payo¤s are
xj1 = max
h
 V j2 (x1) + xj0 + V j2 (x0) ; 0
i
8 j 2MWC (4)
Now I turn to the main result of this section, namely that the MWC is the
equilibrium strategy prole for any initial allocation. In order to prove it I use
the following strategy: to begin with, I calculate the lower bound of the agenda
setters utility under the MWC strategy prole, denoted by U iMWC . Then, I
nd the upper bound of the agenda setters utility if he deviates from the MWC
strategy. Finally, I show that there are no protable deviations from the MWC
strategy.
Lemma 1 Under congressional system the lower bound of the rst period
agenda setters utility if she plays according to the MWC strategy prole is equal
to:
inf U iMWC =
1
2
   1
4n
+ 
1
n
Proof. Let i be the agenda setter in period one. Given the proposal xj1
by player i, player j will accept if he is at least as happy as under keeping the
default policy. Following the MWC strategy, the agenda setter will propose to
player j exactly max
h
0; V j2 (x1) + xj0 + V j2 (x0)
i
, in order to buy his vote.
The agenda setter proposes such payo¤s to n 12 players and they all accept. All
other players obtain zero.
I split the payo¤ of the rst periods coalition members into the component,
denoted by Qj (x0), that depends only on the initial default policy, and the
component that depends on proposal x1, denoted by f j (x1) (for details see
11
Appendix):
xj1 = max
h
0; V j2 (x1) + xj0 + V j2 (x0)
i
= (5)
= max

0; xj0 + V
j
2 (x0)  

1
n
+
n  1
2n
f j (x1)

 max

0; Qj (x0)   n  1
2n
f j (x1)

;
Qj (x0)  xj0 + V j2 (x0)  
1
n
;
where
f j (x1) =
8>><>>:
0 if 9l : xl1 < xj1; l; j 2MWC
xj1 if 8l : xl1 > xj1; l 6= j; l; j 2MWC
xj1
jU j+1 if 9U =

xl1 : x
l
1 = x
j
1; l 6= j and 8m : xl1 < xm1
l 6= m 6= j; l; j;m 2MWC
 :
(6)
Next, I characterize the most expensive MWC. I denote as coalition cost the
sum of coalition memberspayo¤s
P
j2MWC
xjt . The maximal cost of the MWC is
bounded by the following expression:
X
j2MWC
xjt 
n 1
2
n  1
nX
j=1;j 6=i
xj1 
n 1
2
n  1
X
max
j 6=i

0; Qj (x0)

=
1
2
nX
j=1;j 6=i
max

0; Qj (x0)

: (7)
The logic behind this expression is the following: the agenda setter has to
choose n 12 members of her coalition from n  1 players, where n  1 is an even
number. The maximal cost of the coalition with n 12 members cannot be higher
than half of the cost of the coalition with n   1 members. The next step is to
observe that f j (x1)  0. Therefore, xj1  Qj (x0) for all j 2 N .
Then, the upper bound of the MWC cost is obtained when Qj (x0) > 0 for
all j 2 N 3 , and we can neglect the max operator. Substituting for Qj (x0) ; I
obtain: X
j2MWC
xjt 
1
2
nX
j=1;j 6=i
xj1 
1
2
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Qj (x0)
=
1
2
0@ nX
j=1;j 6=i
xj0 + 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
V j2 (x0)  
n  1
n
1A : (8)
3For example, this would be the case if the initial default policy is symmetric.
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The maximal value of the
nP
j=1;j 6=i
xj0 is equal to one. The sum of the continua-
tion values of all players other than the agenda setter is equal to
nP
j=1;j 6=i
V j2 (x0) =
1  V i2 (x0). This expression is bounded from above by 1  1n
 
1  12

, because,
rst, in the last period the maximal cost of the MWC is bounded by 12 (see
equation (2)). Second, the agenda setter in period t will be in the coalition in
period t + 1 only in case she is again chosen to be the agenda setter, because
her default policy will be maximal comparing to other players4 .
As a result, the upper bound of the coalition cost in the rst period is:
X
j2MWC
xjt 
1
2
nX
j=1;j 6=i
xj1 
1
2
nX
j=1;j 6=i

xj0 + V
j
2 (x0)  
1
n

(9)
 1
2

1 + 
 
1  V i2 (x0)
   n  1
n

 1
2

1 + 

1  1
n

1  1
2

   n  1
n

=
1
2
+ 
1
4n
:
Then the lower bound of the expected utility of the rst periods agenda setter
is equal to:
inf U i =
1
2
   1
4n
+ 
1
n
: (10)
Next step is to describe the potentially protable deviations from the MWC
strategy prole in the rst period. Lemma 2 shows that only two proposals has
to be considered.
Lemma 2 Under congressional system the upper bound of the rst period
agenda setters utility if she deviates from the MWC strategy prole is achieved
when:
(i) If n  2(1+)+
p
4+8+52
 , the agenda setters plays according to A0 strat-
egy prole, where A0 is characterized by the following allocation: the agenda
setter and any n 12 other players obtain
2
n+1 , all the rest obtain zero.
5
(ii) If n > 2(1+)+
p
4+8+52
 , the agenda setters plays according to A1
strategy prole, where A1 is characterized by the following allocation: the agenda
setter and any n+12 other players obtain
2
n+3 , all the rest obtain zero.
Proof. The utility of the agenda setter is increasing in her rst period
payo¤ and in the probability to be in the second period coalition. Moreover,
the probability to be in the second period coalition is decreasing in her rst
period payo¤ but not monotonically. In the rst period, under the MWC the
agenda setter obtains the highest payo¤ comparing to other players and she
will never be the coalition member in the second period. Decreasing her payo¤
4 I show in Appendix that this is indeed the case.
5The number in the notation of the allocation denes how many players are included into
the coalition above the n 1
2
required majority.
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by a small amount, the agenda setter does not inuence her chance to be in
the second period coalition. Therefore, it is not worth for the agenda setter to
deviate a bitfrom the allocation specied by the MWC strategy.
In order to have a positive chance to be in the second period coalition the rst
period agenda setter has to propose an allocation that determines her second
period default policy to be not higher than the default policy of at least n 12 other
players. Otherwise she obtains a positive payo¤ in the second period only if she
becomes the agenda setter again.
In order to achieve a positive chance to be in the second period coalition at
a minimum cost, she allocates 2n+1 to herself and to
n 1
2 other players (A0). I
can assume that her payo¤ is by " less than payo¤s of coalition members, where
" is a very small number. As a result, she will be in the winning coalition with
probability n 12n .
Moreover, if she allocates 2n+3 to herself and to
n+1
2 other players (A1), she
will be a coalition member for sure6 . Hence there is no sense for her to allocate
positive payo¤s to more than n+12 players .
Therefore, if the agenda setter deviates form the MWC strategy, she has to
choose between these two allocations, A0 and A1. The following trade o¤ takes
place: under A0 the probability to be in the second period coalition is lower
comparing to A1, but the payo¤ in the rst period, and, hence, the default
policy in the second period, is higher.
The expected utilityof the agenda setter under A0 is
EUA0i =
2
n+ 1
+ 

1
n
+
2
n+ 1
n  1
2n

: (11)
The expected utility of the agenda setter under A1 is
EUA1i =
2
n+ 3
+ 

1
n

1  2
n+ 3

+
2
n+ 3
n  1
n

: (12)
The di¤erence between these expressions is equal to
EUA0i   EUA1i =
4n  n2 + 4n+ 
(n+ 1) (n+ 3)n
8<:  0 i¤ n  2(1+)+
p
4+8+52

< 0 i¤ n > 2(1+)+
p
4+8+52

(13)
The intuition for this result is that with an increase in n the agenda setters
payo¤ in the rst period decreases, and she is more willing to trade it for the
higher chances to be in the second period coalition, therefore she prefers A1.
Moreover, for a higher  the maximal value of n that will be consistent with the
optimal A0 will be lower because the agenda setter will strongly prefer a higher
chance to be in the second period coalition over a higher payo¤ in the rst one.
In this lemma I do not consider the feasibility of allocations A0 and A1; in
the sense that they will be accepted, once proposed by the agenda setter. I do
6 I assume again that agenda setters payo¤ is by " less than the payo¤s of the other coalition
members.
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not have the formal proof, but I have a strong intuition that these allocations
are feasible for any initial default policy. Nevertheless, I do not need the proof
of the feasibility in order to obtain the main results of this section.
Combining the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, I can state the following result:
Proposition 2 Under congressional system the MWC strategy prole is the
unique equilibrium of two periods game if n  5 ,.
Proof. In the second period the MWC strategy prole is the equilibrium
due to Proposition 1.
In the rst period all coalition members accept the MWC proposal due to the
construction of payo¤s. The agenda setter cannot propose to coalition members
the payo¤s lower than under the MWC strategy, because then the proposal
would be rejected.
The possible candidates deviations from the MWC are described in Lemma
2. For n  7 the lower bound of the expected utility from playing according
to the MWC strategy (8) is strictly higher than the expected utility of playing
according to the deviation strategy (9) and (10). When n = 5, the numerical
simulations for various initial default policy vectors show the same result.
The uniqueness follows from a simple observation that the MWC strategy
prole maximizes an expected utility of the agenda setter in both periods. Be-
cause the agenda setter has the advantage of the proposal, she sets which strat-
egy prole will be realized.
As mentioned above, I do not need to prove that allocations A0 and A1 are
feasible. The agenda setter does not deviate, hence the question of feasibility of
such allocations is not relevant.
For n = 3 there will be cases when it will be protable for the agenda setter
to deviate to A0. It happens when the following conditions are satised:
1  xj0

+ 
1
3
<
1
2
(1 + ) if xj0 < x
l
0;
1  3
3 + 
xj0

+ 
1
3
<
1
2
(1 + ) if xj0 > x
l
0;
1  6 + 
6 + 2
xj0

+ 
1
3
<
1
2
(1 + ) if xj0 = x
l
0;
where i is the agenda setter, and l and j are two other players. These conditions
will hold if the initial default policy is low for the agenda setter and if the default
policies of two other players are relatively close.
2.4.2 Innite game
In this section I consider the innite game under a congressional system. The
preference function of player i now is given as
Ui =
1X
t=1
t 1xit: (14)
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This game satises the property of continuity in the innity: the discounted
value of a game is limited in any period, because the payo¤s are limited in each
period and the players discount the future. Hence, for the strategy prole to
be a sub-game perfect, it has to satisfy the one-stage deviation principle. It is
enough to show that no player wants to deviate in period t, if in all subsequent
periods all players play according to the equilibrium strategy (see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1998)).
First, I dene the MWC strategy prole. It is similar to Denition 2:
Denition 3 The MWC strategy prole of innite game and congressional
system is dened as follows: let i 2 N denote the agenda setter in period t.
1. For each player j the decision rule in period t is as follows:
accept the proposal xt i¤
xjt + V
j
t+1 (xt)  xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; (15)
where the LHS is the expected utility of coalition member j if he accepts proposal
xjt , and RHS is his expected utility if he rejects. V
j
t+1 (xt) denotes the continua-
tion value of player j when the default policy in period t+ 1 is vector xt. It is
dened recursively as
V jt+1 (xt) = E
h
xjt+1 (xt) + V
j
t+2 (xt+1)
i
:
2. The agenda setter forms the MWC and coalition payo¤s are
x jt =max
h
 V jt+1 (xt) + xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1)

; 0
i
8 j 2MWC (16)
I begin with some characteristics of the MWC:
Lemma 3 If the default payo¤ of player j is zero, then he supports the
MWC proposal even if his payo¤ is zero.
Proof. Consider player j in period t such that xjt 1 = 0. If x
j
t = 0 and
the MWC proposal is accepted , then V jt+1 (xt) =
1
n +
1
n
P1
=1 
 . If the MWC
proposal is rejected then V jt+1 (xt 1) =
1
n

1  Cjt+1 (xt 1)

+ 1n
P1
=1 
 , where
Cjt+1 (xt 1)  0 is the coalition cost if j is the agenda setter in period t + 1.
Then  V jt+1 (xt) + V jt+1 (xt 1)  0 and, according to (22):
x jt =max
h
 V jt+1 (xt) + 0 + V jt+1 (xt 1)

; 0
i
= 0 (17)
The next lemma follows directly from Lemma 3 and equation (23):
Lemma 4 The allocation is an extreme one starting from period t+2 : the
agenda setter obtains the whole budget, while other players obtain zero.
The next lemma considers players with equal default policies:
Lemma 5 Consider two players l; k 2 N such that xkt 1 = xlt 1. Then the
agenda setter includes them into the coalition in period t with equal probabilities.
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Proof. (i) Suppose that both players are included into coalition with prob-
ability 1 or 0. Then proof is obvious.
(ii) Consider the case where the agenda setter has to choose one coalition
member between players k and l. Note that if they are included into a the
coalition with equal probability 12 , then x
k
t = x
l
t. Suppose that both players
have a positive inclusion probability, but l is included with higher probability
than k. This implies that both players support the proposal for the same payo¤
xkt = x
l
t, otherwise the agenda setter would include only the player with lower
coalition payo¤. Then V kt+1 (xt 1) < V
l
t+1 (xt 1), while, rst, player l has a
higher probability to be next period coalition member and, second, both of
them face the same probability to be the agenda setter and the same coalition
costs. xkt 1 = x
l
t 1 and x
k
t = x
l
t ) V kt+1 (xt) = V lt+1 (xt). Therefore, xkt > xlt,
which is a contradiction.
Suppose that only l is included into a coalition, which implies that player l
will support the proposal for the payo¤xlt  xkt . Then V kt+1 (xt 1) < V lt+1 (xt 1)
and V kt+1 (xt) < V
l
t+1 (xt). But V lt+1 (xt)+V lt+1 (xt 1) >  V kt+1 (xt)+V kt+1 (xt 1),
which implies xlt > x
k
t and is again an contradiction.
This Lemma is easily extended to any number of players with identical initial
default policies.
The proof of the main result in this section follows the same steps as the
proof of Proposition 2: rst, I calculate the lower bound of the agenda setters
utility under the MWC strategy prole, denoted by U iMWC . Second, I nd
the upper bound of the agenda setters utility if she deviates from the MWC
strategy. And nally, I show that there are no protable deviations from the
MWC strategy.
Lemma 6 Under congressional system the lower bound of the agenda setter
utility if she plays according to the MWC strategy is equal to:
1
2
+
1
n
1X
=1

Proof. Suppose all players play according to the MWC strategy. Let i
denote the agenda setter in period t. The payo¤ to the coalition member j in
period t has to satisfy the condition (21):
xjt + 
0@ 1
n
+
1
n
X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt; ast+1)x
j
t+1 (xt; ast+1)
i1A+ 1
n
1X
=2
 
xjt 1 + 

1
n

1  Cjt+1 (xt 1)

+
1
n
X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt 1; ast+1)x
j
t+1 (xt 1; ast+1)
i1A+
+2
1
n
X
ast+1

1
n

1  Cjt+2 (xt+1)

+
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1n
X
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt+1; ast+2)x
j
t+2 (xt+1; ast+1)
i1A+
+
1
n
1X
=3
 ; (18)
where ast 2 N is the identity of
the agenda setter in period t. pjt+1 (xt; ast+1) is the probability for player j to
be in the coalition in period t+ 1. Cjt (xt 1) is the cost of the MWC in period
t for player j, if j is the agenda setter.
In period t+ 1 the payo¤ of coalition member j has to satisfy the following
condition:
xjt+1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  xjt+ (19)
+
0@ 1
n
+
1
n
X
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt; ast+2)x
j
t+2 (xt; ast+2)
i1A+ 1
n
1X
=2

When the MWC proposal is accepted in period t, the coalition member js
payo¤ in period t+1 depends only on xjt and does not depend on the identity of
the agenda setter. Therefore xjt+2 (xt; ast+2) = x
j
t+1. Hence, according to (22):
xjt+1 = max
2664 1
1   1n
P
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt; ast+2)
ixjt ; 0
3775 : (20)
Players j payo¤ in period t+1 will be positive if and only if his payo¤ in period
t is positive, otherwise it would be zero. Moreover, the players payo¤ in t + 1
is the increasing function of his payo¤ in period t.
To begin with, I assume that the coalition payo¤s of all potential coalition
members in period t, xjt , is positive. Then, I can rewrite condition (22) in period
t as:
xjt+
1
n
X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
2664pjt+1 (xt; ast+1) 1
1   1n
P
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt; ast+2)
ixjt
3775 =
xjt 1+
0@  1
n
Cjt+1 (xt 1) +
1
n
X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt 1; ast+1)x
j
t+1 (xt 1; ast+1)
i1A+
+2
1
n
X
ast+1

  1
n
Cjt+2 (xt+1)+
18
1n
X
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt+1; ast+2)x
j
t+2 (xt+1; ast+1)
i1A : (21)
Suppose that the condition (28) also holds for player i for some payo¤ exit.
Then, if I sum condition (28) over the players, the second and the third ex-
pressions on the RHS are canceled out, because they are equal to the sum of
coalition memberspayo¤s minus the sum of coalition costs, for all MWCs. As a
result, the sum of the coalition payo¤s of all players has to satisfy the following
condition:
nX
k=1
0BB@1 +  1n X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt; ast+1)
i 1
1   1n
P
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt; ast+2)
i
1CCAxkt
=
nX
k=1
xkt 1;
where
nP
k=1
xkt =
nP
j=1;j 6=i
xjt + exit. Note that
1 + 
1
n
X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt; ast+1)
i 1
1   1n
P
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt; ast+2)
i > 1:
Then X
j 6=i
xjt 
X
j 6=i
xjt + exit  nX
j=1
xjt 1 = 1:
For that reason, the cost of the MWC is bounded from above by 12 . Then,
the lower bound of the expected utility of the agenda setter is:
inf EUMWCi =
1
2
+
1
n
1X
=1
 : (22)
The case, when RHS of condition (28) is negative or zero is similar and
considered in Appendix
As a next step, I describe probable deviations from the MWC strategy:
Lemma 7 Under congressional system the upper bound of the expected utility
of the agenda setter if she deviates from the MWC is:
supU it (xt 1)=
2
n+ 1
+

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2n
2n   (n  1)
2
n+ 1

+
1
n
1X
=2

I outline the main ideas of the proof, the technical details are presented in
Appendix.
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Proof. According to the one stage deviation principle, I assume that the
agenda setter deviates only in the current period, and after that the MWC
strategy is played.
For the agenda setter there is no sense to allocate any positive payo¤ to less
than n 12 players and to more than
n+1
2 players due to the same reasoning as in
Lemma 2. As a result I need only to consider two types of coalitions, with n 12
and with n+12 players. Depending on coalition memberspayo¤s, the rst type
yields for the agenda setter the probability to be in the next period coalition
1
n  pc  n 12n and the second type n 12n < pc  1.
The analysis is simplied if one notes the following: it is impossible that the
agenda setter has a higher payo¤ than any other player in period t and has a
positive probability to be in the winning coalition in period t + 1 (Equations
(42) and (43), see Appendix).
Then, the upper bound to the agenda setters utility if she deviates from the
MWC and wants to achieve at least probability n 12n to be in the next coalition,
is the allocations A0 described in Lemma 2: the agenda setter and other n 12
players obtain 2n+1 , all the rest obtain zero. The upper bound of the expected
utility for the agenda setter is then as follows:
supU iA0t (xt 1) =
2
n+ 1
+

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2n
2n   (n  1)
2
n+ 1

+
1
n
1X
=2
 (23)
The calculations show that expected utility of the agenda setter under the
strategies which guarantee higher probability of the coalition membership will
always be lower than the upper bound value for A0 allocation.
I consider only the case when the agenda setter tries to inuence her chances
to be in the winning coalition in the following period, and not in the more
remote ones. The agenda setter in period t can inuence her chances to be in
the winning coalition in period t+ 2 only if she chooses the allocation in which
her payo¤ is lower than payo¤s of at least n  3 other players. Such allocations
require a crucial decrease in the agenda setter payo¤ in period t and the resulting
expected utility will be lower than supU iA0t (xt 1), for all xt 1. Under all other
possible allocations in period t, the agenda setter will obtain zero in period t+2
and in all subsequent periods, unless she is the agenda setter again. Moreover,
she can not inuence her chances to be in the winning coalition in the period
more remote than t+ 2 at all.
Now I will turn to the main result of this section:
Proposition 4 Under congressional system the MWC strategy prole is an
equilibrium of innite game if n  5.
Proof. The agenda setter cannot propose to coalition members payo¤s
lower than the MWC proposal, because then the proposal will be rejected. All
coalition members accept the MWC proposal due to the payo¤s construction.
For n  7 the lower bound of the expected utility from playing according to
the MWC strategy (30) is strictly higher than the upper bound of the expected
utility of playing according to the deviation strategy (38). When n = 5, the
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numerical simulations for various initial default policy vectors show the same
result.
2.5 Parliamentary system
2.5.1 Two period game
In this section I consider a parliamentary system. The agenda setter has to buy
an exogenously given coalition and she can include additional members into
such a coalition. This leads to the following behavior in the two periods game:
Proposition 3 Under parliamentary system, the strategy prole is an equi-
librium of two periods game if it has the following form:
let i be the agenda setter in period t and EWCt  N be a set of n 12
members of the exogenous coalition in period t. Then
i. For each player j; j 6= i, the decision rule in period t is as follows:
accept proposal xt i¤
xjt + V
j
2 (xt)  xjt 1 + V j2 (xt 1) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; t = 1; 2 (24)
ii The agenda setter proposes the following allocation
x jt = x
j
t 1 8 j 2 EWCt (25)
xlt = 0 8l =2 EWCt (26)
Proof. For the second period the proof is obvious and similar to Proposition
1.
In the rst period the agenda setter again faces the exogenously given coali-
tion, so she has to propose to coalition member j at least
xj1 =  V j2 (x1) + xj0 + V j2 (x0) ; (27)
where V j2 (x1) is the continuation value of player j, as in Denition 1. All players
will accept such a proposal.
The continuation value can be written in the following way: note, that
there are k = n!
(n 12 )!(n n 12 )!
possible exogenous coalitions for a given agenda
setter and each player appears exactly in half of the coalitions. Then player js
continuation value V j2 (x1) is:
V j2 (x1) =
1
n
1
k

k   k
2

x11 + x
2
1 + :::+ x
j 1
1 + :::+ x
n
1

+
n  1
n
1
2
xj1 =
=
1
n

1  1
2

1  xj1

+
n  1
n
1
2
xj1 =
1
2n
+
1
2
xj1:
Then
xj1 = x
j
0 + V
j
2 (x0)  V j2 (x1) = xj0 + 

1
2n
+
1
2
xj0

  

1
2n
+
1
2
xj1

)
xj1 = x
j
0:
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Note that payo¤s in the rst period does not a¤ect the agenda setters
chances to be in the winning coalition in the second period. Therefore, the
agenda setters expected utility is a strictly positive function of her payo¤ in
the rst period:
U i = xi1 + 

1
2n
+
1
2
xi1

: (28)
Thus, the agenda setter has no reasons to pay coalition members more than
 V j2 (x1)+xj0+V j2 (x0). For the same reasons she does not have incentives to
increase the number of coalition members by proposing a positive payo¤ to the
players who are not in the EWC. As a result, the strategy prole described in
the proposition is an equilibrium. Moreover, the coalition formed in equilibrium
is the MWC: there is no cheaper coalition, which induces the acceptance of the
agenda setters proposal.
This proposition shows that the parliamentary as well as the congressional
systems are characterized in equilibrium by the MWC strategy prole. The
di¤erence between these systems is that under the parliamentary system the
agenda setter will not necessarily obtain the maximal payo¤: for example if the
initial default policy allocates 1 to some member of exogenous coalition, the
payo¤ of this player will be equal to one, and the agenda setters to zero.
2.5.2 Innite game
Under the parliamentary system there is no apparent reason for the agenda
setter to deviate from the MWC strategy. If the MWC strategy is played in all
subsequent periods, any deviation from the MWC by the agenda setter in the
current period will not change the probability to be in the next period coalition
and will decrease her payo¤ via a decrease in her default policy and an increase
in the default policy of other players. Hence, she will always choose the MWC
strategy. More formally:
Proposition 5 Under the parliamentary system the strategy prole is an
equilibrium of innite game if it has the following form:
Let i be the agenda setter in period t and EWCt  N be a set of n 12
members of the exogenous coalition in period t. Then
i. The acceptance rule in period t is as follows: accept i¤
xjt + V
j
t+1 (xt)  xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; (29)
ii. The agenda setter proposes the following allocation
x jt = x
j
t 1 8 j 2 EWCt (30)
xlt = 0 8l =2 EWCt (31)
Proof. As in the case of a congressional system, in order to show that a
strategy prole is an equilibrium, I have to show that it is not protable to make
a one period deviation.
22
Assume that all players play according to the strategy prole which is de-
scribed in the proposition. Due to the same calculations as in Proposition 4,
the continuation value of player j in period t is:
V jt+1 (xt 1) =
1
2n
+
1
2
xjt 1 + V
j
t+2

xt+1

xjt 1

;
V jt+1 (xt) =
1
2n
+
1
2
xjt + V
j
t+2

xt+1

xjt

:
According to (30), the agenda setter proposes to a coalition member xjt = x
j
t 1.
Then the following condition is satised:
xjt = x
j
t 1 + V
j
t+1 (xt 1)  V jt+1 (xt) :
Therefore, such payo¤ makes a coalition member indi¤erent between ac-
cepting and rejecting the proposal, hence all coalition members will accept the
proposal. When only members of exogenous coalition j 2 WCt obtain positive
payo¤s xjt = x
j
t 1, the coalition is the MWC.
Note, that the expected payo¤ in each period is an increasing function of the
players own default policy and does not depend on the distribution of payo¤s
among other players. Then, like in Proposition 4, the expected utility of the
agenda setter is a strictly increasing function of her payo¤ in period t. Hence, she
will not deviate from the strategy prole described in (30) and (31). Therefore,
the MWC strategy prole is an equilibrium.
There is still a di¤erence between the congressional and the parliamentary
systems: under the congressional system the equilibrium allocation converges
to the extreme allocation at most after three periods. Under the parliamentary
system the convergence may take longer time, if it happens at all. There is
always a positive probability that a player with an original positive default
policy appears period after period in the winning coalition implying that she
obtains positive payo¤s all the time. Another di¤erence between the two systems
is that under the parliamentary system the agenda setter will not always obtain
the highest payo¤ among other players.
2.6 Risk aversion
In this section I consider only two period games. For simplicity, I consider a
specic example with the symmetric initial default policy vector. Moreover, I
assume that each player i has the following utility function of player i:
U it =
 
xit
1 
; 8t; 0 <  < 1 (32)
2.6.1 Congressional system
Under the congressional system, the agenda setter in the rst period faces the
following problem:
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max
S1;x1

1  S1xj1
1 
+ E
 
xi2 (x1)
1 
s:t:

xj1
1 
+ E

xj2 (x1)
1 


1
n
1 
+ 
 
1
n

1  n  1
2
1
n
1 
+
+
n  1
2
1
2

1
n
1 !
;
where S is the size of a coalition.
The numerical solutions for the agenda setter maximization problem are
presented in Table 1. The results show that with low levels of risk aversion,
the agenda setter plays according to the MWC strategy. With an increase in
risk aversion parameter , the agenda setter will generally increase risk sharing
between herself and coalition members under the inuence of two forces: rst,
she herself will prefer to increase her chances to be in the winning coalition in
the future. Second, coalition members will demand a higher payo¤ in order to
support the MWC allocation because they will trade o¤ higher payo¤ in the
rst period for the lower chances to be in the coalition in the second period.
Risk sharing is composed of more equal distribution of the budget in the rst
period which implies more equal distribution of coalition payments and more
equal chances to coalition membership in the second period. With an increase in
the risk aversion, the agenda setter will have to increase the payo¤s of coalition
members or to increase the number of coalition members in order to increase
their probability to be in the winning coalition in the second period. Eventually,
when  is su¢ ciently high, the agenda setter proposes symmetric allocation
equal to the initial default policy.
As it can be seen from Table 1, the agenda setter chooses di¤erent patterns
of the equilibrium allocation, depending on n and . With an increase in n the
agenda setter has to be less risk averse in order to switch from the MWC to
some risk sharing allocation or to propose the symmetric allocation. In general,
the number of coalition members increases with an increase in , but not always
monotonically: see for example n = 9 and n = 11. Moreover, the results show
that a number of politicians may have an inuence on the policy outcomes even
in such simple setting.
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Table 1 Equilibrium allocation
n 5 7 9 11 13 17 21 37 45
 = 0:1 MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC
0.2 MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC
0.3 MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC MWC WC1 WC2
0.35 MWC A1 MWC MWC MWC MWC WC1 WC2 WC3
0.4 A0 B1 A1 A1 A1 A1 WC1 WC3 WC4
0.45 A0 B1 B1 B1 B1 A1 A1 A1 WC6
0.5 B0 B0 B2 B2 B2 A3 A3 A4 A4
0.55 B0 MWC B2 B3 B3 B4 B5 B7 B8
0.6 MWC WC1 WC1 WC2 WC3 B5 B7 B13 B15
0.65 C1 C2 C2 C3 C4 C6 C8 C15 C19
0.7 C1 C2 C3 sd sd sd sd sd sd
0.8 sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd
0.9 sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd sd
MWC - the minimal winning coalition.
WCk - allocation characterized by n 12 +k coalition members. Coalition members
obtain their continuation values.
Ak - allocation characterized by n 12 + k coalition members. The agenda setters
payo¤ is by " less than payo¤ of coalition members, where " is arbitrarily small.
Bk - allocation characterized by n 12 + k coalition members. The agenda setters
payo¤ is signicantly lower than payo¤ of coalition members.
Ck - allocation characterized by n 12 + k coalition members. The agenda setters
payo¤ is equal to payo¤ of coalition members.
sd - the initial symmetric default policy.
2.6.2 Parliamentary system
Consider a simple example with three players and a symmetric initial default
policy. The maximization problem of the agenda setter in the rst period is:
max
 
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
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1 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where xi1, x
j
1 and x
l
1 are the rst period payo¤s of the agenda setter, the coalition
member and the opposition member respectively.
With an increase in risk aversion, the coalition member will demand a higher
MWC. Therefore, the agenda setter may want to give some positive payo¤ to
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the opposition member, decreasing by this action the payo¤ required by the
coalition member in order to support the proposal, and smoothing her own
payo¤ in the case she will be the agenda setter in the second period.
The numerical solutions for this problem for di¤erent values of the risk aver-
sion parameter show that the agenda setter will always prefer the MWC: she will
allocate zero payo¤ to the opposition member and the minimal feasible payo¤
to the coalition member.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that the introduction of the endogenous default policy
into a dynamic distributive model of legislature bargaining among risk neutral
players does not change the general results obtained in models with the exoge-
nous default policy: in the two-period and the innite framework the equilibrium
is characterized by the minimal winning coalition for the congressional and the
parliamentary systems. Moreover, under the congressional system the equilib-
rium allocation becomes extreme at most after two periods: the agenda setter
gets the whole budget.
For risk averse players in the two period game the results are di¤erent for the
two systems: under the parliamentary regime the equilibrium is characterized
by the minimal winning coalition, while under the congressional system risk
sharing takes place if the risk aversion is strong enough. The general pattern of
the equilibrium under the congressional system is the following: with an increase
in the risk aversion the number of the players in a coalition increases, creating a
supermajority coalition. Inside the coalition di¤erent patterns of the allocation
can exist depending on a degree of risk aversion and the number of politicians.
If the players are risk averse, then under the congressional system the agenda
setter may propose an allocation which gives positive payo¤s to more than a
simple majority of players. On the contrary, under the parliamentary system,
the agenda setter will prefer to allocate payo¤s according to the MWC even with
a high degree of risk aversion. These results predict that we will obtain broader
programs under the congressional system than under the parliamentary system
and will also obtain more supermajoritycoalitions. The empirical validation
of this prediction can be an interesting extension of this research.
Kalandrakis (2002) considers a more general framework of the model for the
system named congressional in the current paper. He considers a general class
of concave utility functions under the innite horizon. He also accounts for the
possibility that the probabilities of being the agenda setter can be asymmetric
across players. His main result is that if the players are not much risk averse and
their number is higher than 5 the equilibrium allocation converges to an extreme
one within at most three periods, which is the same result as presented in the
current paper for a risk neutral case. Because of a more general framework he
uses much more complex proof techniques.
All results concern only specic kinds of policy programs, namely the alloca-
tion of an exogenously given budget. Under an endogenously given budget the
results may be quite di¤erent and it is possible to model more di¤erences be-
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tween the parliamentary and the congressional systems reecting their specic
features and making the model more realistic.
Another possible extension of the present paper may examine a game in
which playersutility depends not only on redistribution but also on ideological
variable. For example, the distribution of the ideological ideal points within
the one dimensional space usually creates natural coalitions, and combining
this with the redistribution policy and the endogenous default policy, we may
be able to shed the light on a possible trade-o¤ in the process of the coalition
formation.
Still another possible extension can model endogenous agenda setting: the
probability to be the agenda setter in the next period may depend on the al-
location in the current period. This can be modeled by introducing explicit
elections, adding the general public as an additional player.
Certain attention should also be devoted to the endogenous institutions prob-
lem: implementation of the endogenous versus exogenous default policy might
be itself the endogenous choice of politicians. It is interesting to investigate
under what conditions they will prefer one of the two regimes.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Appendix to Lemma 1
1. The continuation value V j2 (x1) is calculated as follows: according to Propo-
sition 1, in the second period a player supports the proposal, if his payo¤ is at
least his default policy. Then, if period ones coalition member j is the agenda
setter in period two then xj2 = 1, because there will be
n 1
2 players with the
default payo¤ equal to zero. If the second period agenda setter is a rst period
coalition member other than j, then xj2 = 0. If the second period agenda setter
is the player who was not a coalition member in the rst period the expected
second period payo¤ of player j is described by function f (x1): if there is a rst
period coalition member whose second period default policy is lower than js,
then xj2 = 0. If j is the cheapest one among the rst period coalition members,
then xj2 = x
j
1. If there are other players with the default policy equal to that of
j, and this default policy is the lowest among members of the rst period coali-
tion, then j obtains his default policy with probability equal to 1jU j+1 , where
jU j is the number of such players.
For example, if n = 5, the coalition size will be 2, and the rst period payo¤s
of coalition members j and l are :
xj1 = max

Qj (x0)   2
3
xj1; 0

and xl1 = max

Ql (x0) ; 0

i¤ xl1 > x
j
1;
xl1 = max

Ql (x0)   2
3
xl1; 0

and xj1 = max

Qj (x0) ; 0

i¤ xl1 < x
j
1;
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xl1 = x
j
1 = max

Ql (x0)   2
3
1
2
xl1; 0

i¤ xl1 = x
j
1:
2. The last step is to show that the following assumption is indeed the
case: the agenda setters default policy in the beginning of the second period is
the highest comparing to all other players. The minimal payo¤ of the agenda
setter in the rst period is 12    14n . Suppose that there is another player l that
demands at least the same payo¤ in the rst period in order to support the
agenda setters proposal. Then the sum of demands of all other n  2 players is
equal to 12 +
1
4n . Then there are possible alternative coalitions to build without
need to pay such high payo¤ to player l.
2.8.2 Appendix to Lemma 6
Consider the case, when RHS of condition (28) is negative or zero. Hence,
xkt = 0 for some k 2 N . Then I can rewrite the condition (21) in the following
way:
xjt
0BB@1 +  1n X
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
pjt+1 (xt; ast+1)
1
1   1n
P
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt; ast+1)
i
1CCA =
max
h
0; xjt 1+ 
0@   1nCjt+1 (xt 1)+
+ 1n
P
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt 1; ast+1)x
j
t+1 (xt 1; ast+1)
i 1A+
+2
1
n
X
ast+1
0@   1nCjt+2 (xt+1)+
+ 1n
P
ast+2;ast+2 6=j
h
pjt+2 (xt+1; ast+2)x
j
t+2 (xt+1; ast+1)
i 1A35 :
(33)
If there is at least one player in period t, who is ready to support the agenda
setters proposal for a zero payo¤, then he will be in the coalition for sure.
Moreover, if the MWC proposal is accepted, the allocation in the next period,
t+1, will be extreme and none of the players obtains a positive payo¤apart from
the agenda setter. If some coalition member deviates in period t and rejects the
proposal, after two periods the allocation will also converge to an extreme one.
This allows me to rewrite the condition (28) as:
xjt = max

0; xjt 1 + 

  1
n
Cjt+1 (xt 1) + P
j
t+1

; (34)
where P jt+1  1n
P
ast+1;ast+1 6=j
h
pjt+1 (xt 1; ast+1)x
j
t+1 (xt 1; ast+1)
i
:
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Assume for simplicity that there is only one player, denoted k, for whom
xkt = 0 (the result is easily extended to more players). It implies that x
k
t 1  
 1nC
k
t+1 (xt 1) is either zero or negative. (20) implies that if x
k
t = 0 then
xkt+1 = 0 and P
k
t+1 = 0.
Note that for all j the following is satised:
Cjt (xt 1) = C
j
t+1 (xt 1) 
1
2
nX
j=1
xjt : (35)
Suppose that (34) is satised for player i for some exit. Summing (34) over all
players I obtain:X
j=1::N
xjt =
X
j 6=k

xjt 1 + 

  1
n
Cjt+1 (xt 1) + P
j
t+1

+ 0: (36)
Adding and subtracting Ckt+1 (xt 1) I obtainX
j=1::N
xjt =
X
j 6=i;k
xjt 1 +

n
Ckt+1 (xt 1) : (37)
All other expressions are canceled out due to the same reasons as in (21). Using
(35) I can rewrite 37 asX
j=1::N
xjt  

n
Ckt+1 (xt 1) =
X
j 6=i;k
xjt 1
)
X
j=1::N
xjt  

2n
X
j=1::N
xjt 
X
j 6=k
xjt 1  1: (38)
Then X
j=1::N
xjt 
1 
1  2n
 : (39)
Player k will be in the coalition for sure. Hence, some player with the
highest coalition payo¤ xlt, x
l
t at least
1
n , will not be in the coalition. Therefore,
the upper bound for the coalition cost in period t is
supCit (xt 1) =
1
2
X
j 6=i
xjt  
1
n
 exit  12
 
1 
1  2n
   1
n
!
=
1
2
2n2   2n+ 
(2n  )n <
1
2
:
2.8.3 Appendix to Lemma 7
The Lemma is proved in three steps. First, I calculate the upper bound for
the agenda setter utility, if her probability to be in the next period coalition,
denoted by pc, is n 12n
2
n 1  pc  n 12n . Second, I consider the strategy which
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secure the next period coalition place for the agenda setter, namely pc = 1.
Last, I consider the strategy which yields n 12n < p
c  1.
1. Consider the coalition with n 12 members. To start with, I investigate
the case where the agenda setter aims to achieve probability n 12n to be in the
next coalition. Denote the agenda setter in period t by i, coalition members by
j, and other players by l. Player i tries to allocates the budget in the way that
guarantees her a place in t+1 coalition in case the agenda setter will be player
l.
Starting from period t + 1 the MWC is played and in period t + 2 the
allocation will always be an extreme one. In the period t+ 1 only one coalition
member will obtain a positive payo¤ when the agenda setter will be player l:
either player i or one of the players j. When player i is the coalition member
in period t+ 1, her payo¤ has to satisfy:
xit+1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  xit + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
xit+1

+
1
n
1X
=2

) xit+1 = xit + 
n  1
2n
xit+1 : (40)
The payo¤s of players l in period t+1 are equal to zero. The payo¤ of player
j, when he is a coalition member, has to satisfy
xjt+1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  xjt + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2
n  1x
i
t+1

+
1
n
1X
=2

) xjt+1 = xjt +

n
xjt+1 : (41)
In order to be in the second period coalition, player i has to allocate xjt and
xit in the way that implies x
i
t+1 < x
j
t+1by an arbitrary small amount. Assume
that xit+1 = x
j
t+1.
As a result, there are four conditions which dene playerspayo¤s:
xit+1 = x
i
t + 
n  1
2n
xit+1 ) xit+1 =
1
1   n 12n
xit; (42)
xjt+1 = x
j
t +

n
xjt+1 ) xjt+1 =
1
1  n
xjt ; (43)
xit+1 = x
j
t+1; (44)
and a budget constraint
xit = 1 
n  1
2
xjt : (45)
The resulting payo¤s are
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xjt = 2
 n+ 
 n+ 2n  2   n2 ; (46)
xit =
 2n+ n  
 n+ 2n  2   n2 : (47)
The main di¤erence between the innite game versus allocation A0 under
the two period framework is as follows: in order to achieve pc = n 12n , it is not
enough that the agenda setters payo¤ in period t is only by " smaller than that
of other coalition members, where " is arbitrarily small. Her payo¤ in period t
has to be signicantly lower than that of other coalition members. For example,
if n = 5, and  = 0:5, the agenda setter obtains 0.3077 in period t, while
coalition members payo¤ is 0.3462. If the agenda setter proposes allocation A0,
then pc = n 12n
2
n 1 =
1
n . Varying coalition payo¤s between payo¤s specied in
(46)(47) and A0 payo¤s, the agenda setter can obtain n 12n
2
n 1  pc  n 12n .
Therefore, the upper bound to the agenda setters utility is as follows. Pay-
o¤s are consisted with allocation A0 described in Lemma 2: the agenda setter
and other n 12 players obtain
2
n+1 , all the rest obtain zero. But the probability
to be in the next coalition pc = n 12n . Then, the upper bound of the expected
utility for the agenda setter is
supU iA0t (xt 1) =
2
n+ 1
+

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2n
2n   (n  1)
2
n+ 1

+
1
n
1X
=2
 : (48)
2. Next, I consider the strategy which guarantees for the agenda setter a
place in the next period coalition. The number of coalition members in this case
is n+12 . If the agenda setter is the coalition member in period t+ 1, her payo¤
has to satisfy
xit+1 +
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=1
  xit + 

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
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
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n
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) xit+1 = xit + 
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n
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n
n   (n  1)

xit   xjt+1

n

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
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) xjt+1 =
n (n+ 1)
n (n+ 1)   (n  1)

xjt  

n
xit+1

: (51)
By analogy with (4346), there are four conditions which dene A1 payo¤s
xit+1 =
n
n   (n  1)

xit   xjt+1

n

; (52)
xjt+1 =
n (n+ 1)
n (n+ 1)   (n  1)

xjt  

n
xit+1

; (53)
xit+1 = x
j
t+1; (54)
xit = 1 
n+ 1
2
xjt : (55)
The resulting payo¤s are
xit+1 = x
j
t+1 = 2
n
n2 + (3  2)n+ 6 ; (56)
xjt = 2
n2 + n+ 2
(n2 + (3  2)n+ 6) (n+ 1) ; (57)
xit = 1 
n+ 1
2
2
n2 + n+ 2
(n2 + (3  2)n+ 6) (n+ 1) = 2
(1  )n+ 2
n2 + (3  2)n+ 6 : (58)
The expected utility of the agenda setter is
U iA1t (xt 1) = 2
(1  )n+ 2
n2 + (3  2)n+ 6+
3n2   n  2n + 6
n (n2 + 3n  2n + 6)+
1
n
1X
=2
 (59)
Note that
supU iA0t (xt 1) U iA1t (xt 1) = 2n
n2 + ( 4 + 4)n+ 11
((2  )n+ ) (n+ 1) (n2 + (3  2)n+ 6) > 0
The upper bound of the agenda setters utility under A0 allocation is higher
than under A1 allocation for the relevant parameters.
3. The last step is to consider the strategies which secure for the agenda
setter the place in the next coalition with n 12n < p
c < 1. Consider the coalition
with n+12 members. The agenda setter can allocate the payo¤s which are equal
to her own to some coalition members. If there are k such players from n+12
coalition members, then the probability to be in the next coalition for the agenda
setter is
32
pc =
n  3
2n
2
k + 1
+
n+ 3  2 (k + 1)
2n
1
k + 1
+
k
n
1
k
=
3
2
n  1
n (k + 1)
Under A0 the probability to be in the coalition is n 12n . Hence k < 2, and I
have to investigate only the case where one player obtains the payo¤ equal to
that of the agenda setter. In this case pc = 32
n 1
2n . Note that other values of
n 1
2n < p
c < 1 are not obtainable for the agenda setter.
Conditions which dene payo¤s are as follows (by analogy to (4346):
xit+1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  xit + 

1
n
 
1  xit+1

+
3
4
n  1
n
xit+1

+
1
n
1X
=2

) xit+1 = xit + 

  1
n
xit+1 +
3
4
n  1
n
xit+1

) xit+1 =  4xit
n
 4n  7 + 3n : (60)
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xit+1 = x
j
t+1; (62)
2xit = 1 
n  1
2
xjt : (63)
The resulting payo¤s are
xit+1 = x
j
t+1
2
n2 + ( 5 + 3)n+ 9 n;
xit =  
1
2
 4n  7 + 3n
n2   5n+ 3n+ 9 ;
xit+1 =
2
n2 + ( 5 + 3)n+ 9 n:
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The expected utility of the agenda setter is
U iA1t (xt 1) =  
1
2
 4n  7 + 3n
n2   5n+ 3n+ 9 +
1
n
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=2

+

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n
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 :
The upper bound of the agenda setters utility under A0 allocation is higher for
the relevant parameters than U iA1t (xt 1):
supU iA0t (xt 1) U iA1t (xt 1) = 2n
17   10n+ 4n+ n2
(2n  n+ ) (n+ 1) (n2   5n+ 3n+ 9) > 0:
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3 Choice of default policy rules
3.1 Introduction
The number of papers devoted to political games with an endogenous default
policy has been constantly growing recently. By the endogenous default policy
I shall basically mean the situation when the default policy in the absence of a
decision is determined by the policy last implemented. This denition contrasts
with the two kinds of exogenous default policy which are generally considered:
the policy that gives constant benets to all decision makers and the stochastic
default policy.
The current paper investigates a classical divide the cakeproblem. Politi-
cians have to decide how to divide an exogenously given budget. An agenda
setter is chosen randomly in each period and proposes a budget allocation. The
proposal is accepted and implemented if a simple majority supports it; otherwise
the default policy is implemented. Two rules for default policies are compared:
the dynamic endogenous rule and the exogenous rule. Under the exogenous rule,
the default policy is given and is constant in each period. The paper considers
the question which default policy rule will be installed if the players can decide
about it in advance.
The main result of the paper are as follows: if the decision rule is a simple
majority rule, then any of both default policy rules can be chosen. Moreover, it
is possible to characterize what default policy rule would be preferred by each
player depending on his initial default policy.
This paper closely relates to the literature on endogenous political insti-
tutions. This literature considers two stages of the analysis, as suggested by
Buchanan (1987): at the rst stage a constitution is designed, which sets the
rules by which policy decisions are made. At the second stage the policies are
chosen. Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) focus upon the endogenous choice
of the majority needed to implement a policy. A number of papers (Aghion and
Bolton (1997), Maskin and Tirole (2001) Barbera and Jackson (2001)) inves-
tigate choosing how to choose, i.e. voting on voting rules. Besley and Case
(2003) provide literature review as well as empirical evidence using variations in
institutional rules across the United States. Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2003)
incorporate endogenous institutes into the R&D based growth model.
Furthermore, this paper is related to the literature on dynamic political
games with an endogenous default policy. Baron (1996) considers the dy-
namic problem of collective goods programs, where the players have di¤er-
ent preferences regarding the amount of the public good characterized by a
one-dimensional ideal point. Baron shows that the amount of the public good
converges to the median politicians ideal point when the default policy is the
decision made in the previous period. Baron and Diermeier (1998) also use the
endogenous default policy in the two period model which incorporates elections,
governmental formation and legislative bargaining in the two-dimensional spa-
tial environment. Kalandrakis (2002, 2004) considers the similar distributive
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model with endogenous default policy. He investigates a more general frame-
work and obtains the same results as in Winschel (2004). Fong (2004) considers
a two-dimensional spatial model of government formation and the policy choice
with three parties. In addition to the policy position, parties care about political
rents collected in the process. Rents come from the division of pork in the o¢ ce
and side payments within the government. He shows that if the default policy
is endogenous, policies are far away from the center of preferences. They even
move outside the Pareto set of the game. Fong concludes that the exogenous
default policy rule can lead to a higher social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the equilibrium of the game under alternative rules. Section
3.4 considers the symmetric initial default policy. Section 3.5 calculates the
payo¤s under the exogenous rule and Section 3.6 under the endogenous rule.
Section 3.7 discusses the results and concludes.
3.2 Model
The political system consists out of a set of players N = f1; :::; ng where n  3
and odd. Each period, politicians are to allocate a unit of a perfectly divisible
cake among themselves. Let X denote the set of feasible allocations in each
period, that is, X =

x 2 <n+ :
P
n
i=1x
i
t = 1
	
, where xit denotes the payo¤ of
player i at period t.
Each player has a linear utility function that depends on her payo¤ only.
Players discount the future by a common discount factor  < 1. The preferences
are separable over time, so the utility function of player i is
Ui =
1X
t=1
t 1xit: (1)
The game is played as follows: each period nature randomly selects one
player to be the agenda setter. The agenda setter proposes an allocation in X,
and each player responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal.
The decision rule in each period is the simple majority rule. If at least
n+1
2 players support proposal xt in period t, it is implemented. Otherwise, the
default policy is implemented.
I consider two types of default policy:
Denition 1 The endogenous default policy in period t is the allocation in
X that was implemented in the previous period, namely xt 1. x0 2 X is the
default policy in the rst period and is given exogenously.
Denition 2 The exogenous default policy is allocation ex 2 X; which is
given exogenously and is constant over time.
Let ht denote the history of the game up to period t. A feasible action for
player i at date t is denoted by ait (ht). When i is the agenda setter, a
i
t (ht) 2 X
denotes the proposal o¤ered by i at date t, when the history is ht. When i is
not the agenda setter, ait (ht) 2 faccept; rejectg denotes the decision rule by i
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at date t. Strategy si for player i is a sequence of actions

ait (ht)
	1
t=1
, and the
strategy prole s is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player.
Whenever a player is to take an action, she knows what history has occurred,
the rules of the game and the preferences of other players; so the game is of
perfect information.
The solution concept is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. I focus on a
particular class of equilibria called stationary. In such an equilibrium a player
chooses a history-independent strategy in each strategically identical subgame.
In this model, all subgames with the same default policy are strategically iden-
tical, since their action sets and the future sequences of moves are the same.
Thus, the equilibrium considered is a Markovor a state-spaceequilibrium
in which the past history inuences the current play only through its e¤ect on
a state variable that summarizes the direct e¤ect of the past on the current
environment, or, alternatively, the strategies depend only on the payo¤-relevant
information. Then the equilibrium strategy prole can be dened as an n-tuple
of strategies si, that depend only on the actual default policy:

ait (xt 1)
	1
t=1
.
Using this specic type of equilibrium I rule out a possible punishment strategy
prole which typically leads to a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria (see
Baron and Ferejohn (1989)).
Since no player can change the outcome if a proposal is supported by more
than a simple majority, I restrict attention to equilibria in which weakly domi-
nated strategies are eliminated. Otherwise any allocation can be supported as
equilibrium.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section I consider the game which is investigated in details in Winschel
(2004) (Section 2). I will provide just a summary of the results which are useful
for the current paper. I keep numeration of propositions and denitions in
accordance with Winschel (2004).
3.3.1 Exogenous rule
Under the exogenous default policy all subgames in each period are strategically
identical, since their action sets and the future sequences of moves are the same.
In addition, actions taken in any period do not inuence the future periods at
all. As a result, I can summarize the game as a sequence of identical one shot
games. The equilibrium of such game is described in Proposition 1, Section 2:
Proposition 1 a strategy prole is an equilibrium if it has the following
form:
Let i 2 N denote the agenda setter
1. The decision rule for player j is as follows:
accept proposal xt i¤
xjt  exj ; 8 j 2 N; j 6= i:
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2. The agenda setter forms a minimal winning coalition (MWC) which is
characterized as follows: player j is a member of the MWC i¤ j 2 MWC,
where MWC  N is nonempty set which satises
i. jMWCj = n 12 ;
ii. xjt = exj 8 j 2MWC;
xjt = 0 8 j =2MWC;
iii. 8l 2MWC and 8k =2MWC : Pexj
j2MWCnflg
+ exk  Pexj
j2MWC
:
Proof. see Section 2.
3.3.2 Endogenous rule
First, I dene the MWC strategy prole for the endogenous default policy:
Denition 4 The MWC strategy prole is dened as follows: let i 2 N
denote the agenda setter in period t.
1. The acceptance rule in period t is as follows: accept if
xjt + V
j
t+1 (xt)  xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; (2)
where the LHS is the expected utility of the coalition member j if he accepts the
proposal xj2, and the RHS is his expected utility if he rejects. V
j
t+1 (xt) denotes
the continuation value of player j when the default policy in period t + 1 is
vector xt. It is dened recursively as
V jt+1 (xt) = E
h
xjt+1 (xt) + V
j
t+2 (xt+1)
i
:
2. In each period the agenda setter forms the MWC which is characterized
as follows: player j is a member of the MWC i¤ j 2MWC, where MWC  N
is nonempty set which satises:
i. jMWCj = n 12
ii.
x jt =max
h
 V jt+1 (xt) + xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1)

; 0
i
8 j 2MWC; (3)
xjt = 0 8 j =2MWC: (4)
iii. 8l 2MWC and 8k =2MWCX
xjt
j2MWCnflg
+max
  V kt+1 (xt) + xkt 1 + V kt+1 (xt 1) ; 0  Xxjt
j2MWC
: (5)
Thus, in each period the agenda setter chooses exactly n 12 coalition mem-
bers among the cheapest to buy and proposes the minimal payo¤ so that coali-
tion members are indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the proposal.
The following proposition is from Section 2
Proposition 4 For n  5 the MWC strategy prole is an equilibrium.
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Proof. See Section 2.
The following corollary follows from the calculation of the equilibrium pay-
o¤s:
Corollary 1 (i) After at most two periods the MWC payo¤s are extreme: the
agenda setter obtains the whole budget.
(ii) In all periods the payo¤ of the agenda setter is higher than the payo¤ of
any other player.
(iii) If the default payo¤ of player j is zero, then his MWC payo¤ is zero
and he supports the MWC proposal.
(iiii) If there are two players l; k 2 N such that xkt 1 = xlt 1, the agenda
setter includes them into the coalition in period t with equal probabilities.
3.4 Symmetric default policy
In this section I consider the symmetric exogenous default policy vector ex and
symmetric initial endogenous default policy vector x0. The expected payo¤ of
each player in each period for exogenous default policy is:
Exi;EXt =
1
n

1  1
n
n  1
2

+
n  1
n
1
2
1
n
=
n+ 1
2n2
+
n  1
2n2
=
1
n
;8i 2 N; t:
Hence, the expected utility is
EUEXi =
1X
t=1
t 1
1
n
;8i 2 N: (6)
For endogenous default policy the expected payo¤ of player i 2 N is:
Exi;ENDt =
1
n

1  n  1
2
x1

+
n  1
n
1
2
x1 +


1
n

1  n  1
n
1
2
x2

+
n  1
n
1
2
n  1
2n
2
n  1x2

+
1
n
1X
=2

) EUENDi =
1
n
(1 + ) +
1
n
1X
=2
 : (7)
As a result, players are indi¤erent between exogenous and endogenous rules.
This result shows that if players decide about the rule before they observe their
initial default policy and if the expected default policy is 1n for all players, then
they will be indi¤erent between two rules.
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3.5 Exogenous default policy
In this section I concentrate on the case when all players have di¤erent default
policies. Then the probability to be in the coalition depend only on the number
of players who have lower default payo¤s. If there are players with the same
default payo¤s, I have to consider not only their relative ranking, but also
how many they are. This would complicate the computations severely without
adding inside to the results.
If all players have a di¤erent default payo¤s, I can order them from the
minimal initial default payo¤ to the maximal. Then the players numbered from
1 to n 12 are for sure either coalition members or the agenda setter. The players
numbered from n+32 to n are for sure not included into the coalition. Player
n+1
2
is in the coalition with probability 12 : if the agenda setter has a higher default
payo¤ than player n+12 then he is not included into the coalition. Otherwise,
player n+12 is included into the coalition.
Denote set of players numbered from 3 to n 12 as J  N with typical member
j. Then the expected payo¤ of player j in each period is
Exj(ex) = 1
n
 
1 QJ(ex)  exj+ n  1
n
exj ; (8)
where
QJ(ex) =X
j2J
exj + exn+12 + ex1 + ex2:
Denote set of players numbered from n+32 to n as L  N with typical member
l. Then the expected payo¤ of player l is
Exl(ex) = 1
n
 
1 QL ; (9)
where
QL(ex) =X
j2J
exj + ex1 + ex2:
The expected payo¤ of player 1 is
Ex1(ex) = 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
exj   exn+12   ex2
1A+ n  1
n
ex1: (10)
The expected payo¤ of player 2 is
Ex2(ex) = 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
exj   exn+12   ex1
1A+ n  1
n
ex2: (11)
The expected payo¤ of player n+12 is
Ex
n+1
2 (ex) = 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
exj   ex1   ex2
1A+ n  1
2n
exn+12 : (12)
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Note that all payo¤s are non-negative. Due to this I can ignore the non-
negative payo¤s condition, which follows from (3). The expected utility for
T -periods game for each player i 2 N is
EUEXi =
1X
t=1
t 1xi: (13)
All expected payo¤s can be easily calculated and depend only on the default
policy vector.
3.6 Endogenous default policy
Under the MWC equilibrium strategy prole, the allocation will be extreme at
most after two periods. Hence, I have to calculate only the payo¤s in the rst
and in the second period. In the rst period at most n+12 players obtain positive
payo¤s and in the second period at most 2 players obtain positive payo¤s. The
expected utility in the later periods is identical for all players and is equal to 1n
in each period, regardless of the initial default policy.
As in the previous section, I order players according to their default policies.
In the rst period, players from 1 to n 12 will be for sure coalition members.
Players from n+32 to n will be for sure not. Player
n+1
2 will be in the coalition
with probability 12 , depending on whether the agenda setterdefault payo¤ is
higher or lower than his. The chances to be in the second period coalition will
have either player 1 or player 2, if 1 is the agenda setter in the rst period.
Denote by Qi the price that player i has to pay to his coalition in case he
is the agenda setter. Denote set of players numbered from 3 to n 12 as J  N
with typical member j. Then the expected utility of such a player is
UENDj =
1
n
 
1 Qj+ n  1
n
xj1 +
1
n
1X
=1
 : (14)
The expected payo¤ of player j in the second period is 1n . The payo¤ of
player j in the rst period is calculated from the following condition
xj1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  xj0 + 

1
n
 
1 Qj+ n  1
n
xj1

+
1
n
1X
=2
 ; (15)
s:t: xj1  0;
where
Qj =
X
j2J
xj1 + x
n+1
2
1 + x
1
1 + x
2
1a   xj1:
According to (3), the payo¤ is
xj1 = max
0@0; 1
1  
0@xj0   n
0@X
j2J
xj1 + x
n+1
2
1 + x
1
1 + x
2
1a
1A1A1A : (16)
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Denote set of players numbered from n+32 to n as L  N with typical member
l. Then the expected utility of such a player is
UENDl =
1
n
 
1 Ql+  1
n

1
n
+
n  1
n

1  1
n
x22b  
n  1
n
x12

+
1
n
1X
=2
 ;
(17)
where
QL =
X
j2J
xj1 + x
1
1 + x
2
1a + x
n+1
2
1 ; Q
l = QL8l 2 L:
Next, I calculate the expected utilities of players 1 and 2. These two players
are the only ones who can expect positive coalition payo¤s in the second period.
The expected utility of player 1 is
UEND1 =
1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x21b +
1
n
1X
=1

1A (18)
+
n  1
n
 
x11 + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x12

+
1
n
1X
=2

!
:
The second periods payo¤ of player 1 is calculated according to (2) and (3):
x12 +
1
n
1X
=1
  x11 + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x12

+
1
n
1X
=2
 ; (19)
s:t: x12  0
) x12 =
2n
2n   (n  1)x
1
1  0: (20)
Then the rst periods payo¤ of player 1 has to satisfy:
x11 + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x12

+
1
n
1X
=1
  x10+

0@ 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x21b ++
1
n
1X
=1

1A+
n  1
n
 
x11 + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x12

+
1
n
1X
=1

!!
; (21)
s:t: x11  0:
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From (3) the payo¤ is:
x11 + 
n  1
2n
x12 = x
1
0 + 
0B@ 1n
 
 P
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x21b
!
+n 1n
 
x11 + 
n 1
2n x
1
2

1CA) (22)
x11 = max
0@0; 1
2
n (2  ) + 
n (1  ) + 
0@x10 +  1n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x21b
1A1A1A : (23)
In the similar way the expected utility of player 2 is calculated:
UEND2 =
1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11 +
1
n
1X
=1

1A (24)
+
n  2
n
 
x21a +
1
n
1X
=1

!
+
+
1
n
 
x21b + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x22

+
1
n
1X
=2

!
:
The second periods payo¤ of player 2 is then
x22 =
2n
2n   (n  1)x
2
1b  0: (25)
Again, there are two cases to be considered separately: the case when the
rst period agenda setter is player 1 (case b) and otherwise (case a).
Payo¤ x21a has to satisfy the following condition:
x21a +
1
n
1X
=1
  x20 + 
0@ 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11 +
1
n
1X
=1

1A+
+
n  2
n
 
x21a +
1
n
1X
=1

!
+
1
n
 
x21b + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x22

+
1
n
1X
=2

!!
;
(26)
s:t:x21a  0:
From (3) the payo¤ is
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x21a = x
2
0 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+ (27)
+
n  2
n
x21a +
1
n

x21b + 
n  1
2n
x22

)
x21a = max
0@0; n
n (1  ) + 2
0@x20 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+ 2x21b
n (2  ) + 
1A1A1A :
(28)
Payo¤ x21b has to satisfy the following condition:
x21b + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x22

+
1
n
1X
=2
  x20+

0@ 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11 +
1
n
1X
=1

1A+ n  2
n
 
x21a +
1
n
1X
=1

!
+
+
1
n
 
x21b + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
x22

+
1
n
1X
=2

!!
; (29)
s:t: x21b  0:
From (3) the payo¤ is
x21b + 
n  1
2n
x22 = x
2
0 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+
+
n  2
n
x21a +
1
n

x21b + 
n  1
2n
x22

)
x21b = max
0@0; n (2  ) + 
2 (n  )
0@x20 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+ x21an  2n
1A1A1A :
(30)
The expected utility of player n+12 is
UENDn+1
2
=
1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A+ 1
2
x
n+1
2
1 +
1
n
1X
=1
 : (31)
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The rst period payo¤ of player n+12 has to satisfy the following condition
x
n+1
2
1 +
1
n
1X
=1
  x
n+1
2
0 + 
0@ 1
n
0@1 X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A+ 1
2
x
n+1
2
1 ++
1
n
1X
=1

1A ;
s:t: x
n+1
2
1  0:
From (3) the payo¤ is
x
n+1
2
1 = x
n+1
2
0 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A+ 1
2
x
n+1
2
1
1A
) x
n+1
2
1 = max
0@0; xn+120 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A+ 1
2
x
n+1
2
1
1A1A
) x
n+1
2
1 = max
0@0; 2
2  
0@xn+120 +  1n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A1A1A : (32)
As a result, the coalition memberspayo¤s in the rst period are calculated
from the following system of n+32 non linear equations:
x11 = max
0@0; 1
2
n (2  ) + 
n (1  ) + 
0@x10 +  1n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x21b
1A1A1A ; (33)
x21a = max
0@0; n
n (1  ) + 2
0@x20 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+ x21b 2n (2  ) + 
1A1A1A ;
(34)
x21b = max
0@0; n (2  ) + 
2 (n  )
0@x20 + 
0@ 1
n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x
n+1
2
1   x11
1A+ n  2
n
x21a
1A1A1A ;
(35)
xj1 = max
0@0; 1
1  
0@xj0   n
0@X
j2J
xj1 + x
n+1
2
1 + x
1
1 + x
2
1a
1A1A1A j = 3:::n  1
2
;
(36)
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x
n+1
2
1 = max
0@0; 2
2  
0@xn+120 +  1n
0@ X
j2J
xj1   x11   x21a
1A1A1A : (37)
Consider for example the case n = 5. Then the coalition memberspayo¤s
in the rst period are calculated from the following equations:
x11 = max

0;
1
2
n (2  ) + 
n (1  ) + 

x10 + 
1
n
  x31   x21b ;
x21a = max

0;
n
n (1  ) + 2

x20 + 

1
n
  x31   x11+ x21b 2n (2  ) + 

;
x21b = max

0;
n (2  ) + 
2 (n  )

x20 + 

1
n
  x31   x11+ n  2n x21a

;
x31 = max

0;
2
2  

x30 + 
1
n
  x11   x21a :
3.7 Results and discussion
In this section I compare the two alternative default policy rules. I have to relay
on the numerical solution for the equationssystem (33)-(37). The payo¤s and
utilities are calculated for various initial default policy vectors using Matlab
software.
The results of numerical simulations can be summarized as follows: players
with relative high default policies always favor the endogenous rule. Players
who are in the middle of the initial default policy distribution prefer the exoge-
nous rule. Players with low initial default policies favor the endogenous rule,
if their default policy is low in absolute terms, for example, close to zero. But
they prefer the exogenous rule if their default policy is low only in compari-
son with other players. For example, if n = 5 and the initial default policy
is (0:05; 0:1; 0:15; 0:3; 0:4) then the rst three players prefer the exogenous rule
and the last two prefer the endogenous rule. If the initial default policy is
(0:01; 0:14; 0:15; 0:3; 0:4) then the rst player and two last players favor the en-
dogenous rule and the two middleplayers favor the exogenous rule.
As a result, if there exists a relative equal initial distribution on the poor
side of the income distribution then the majority supports the exogenous rule.
The exogenous rule induces a more stable redistribution pattern, but mostly
to the same hands, because the coalition members are mostly the same people
(the middle class and the poor). Good example would be a society with a
large middle class and without an extremely poor population: the middle class
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supports the exogenous rule because it guarantees a stable allocation which
allows them to keep their position in time.
If there exists an initially extremely poor population, then this population
forms a coalition with the rich population and supports the endogenous rule.
The result is an extreme redistribution pattern after at most two periods, but all
players have equal chances to participate in the coalition. In this case players
with high initial allocation, who are repeatedly left outside the coalition un-
der the exogenous rule and do not enjoy redistribution, prefer a more extreme
allocation which equalizes the chances among the players. The initially poor,
despite being constant coalition members under the exogenous rule, prefer an
extreme allocation as well. The reason is that having low initial default policy
leads to a permanently low coalition payo¤ under the exogenous rule. The poor
are ready to trade o¤ safe but low coalition payments in order to get chance to
obtain the whole budget under the endogenous rule.
If I allow for negative payments, the negative payo¤s arise in the equilibrium
under the endogenous rule: players with low default policies may have negative
payo¤s in the rst period. It happens because such players are ready to pay in
order to move to an extreme allocation. Under the exogenous rule all payo¤s are
always non-negative. This changes the trade o¤ between the two rules, and, ex
ante, the poor population have more incentives to support the exogenous rule, in
order to avoid expropriation. As a result, players with low initial default policies
may prefer the exogenous rule if negative payments are allowed, even if they
prefer the endogenous rule otherwise. For example, if the initial default policy
is (0:03; 0:06; 0:11; 0:3; 0:5) and the rule is endogenous, then the rst players
coalition payo¤ is 0, if negative payo¤s are not allowed, and  0:0124 otherwise.
Therefore such player will prefer the endogenous rule if negative payo¤s are
not allowed and the exogenous one otherwise. As a result, compared to the
situation where only non-negative payo¤s are allowed, the exogenous rule has
more chances to be chosen.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Corollary Suppose that players can choose the default policy rule. Then
(i) if the decision rule is a simple majority rule, then any of both default
policy rules can be chosen depending on the initial default policy.
(ii) Players with relative high default policies always favor the endogenous
rule.
(iii) Players, who are in the middle of the initial default policy distribution,
always prefer the exogenous rule.
(iv) Players with a low initial default policy may prefer either the endoge-
nous or the exogenous rule, depending on the default policy and on whether the
negative payo¤s are allowed.
The model suggests the following empirical prediction: the countries with
more equal income distribution, without extreme poor population, would tend
to use exogenous default policy rules to a greater extent compared with countries
with less unequal distribution. Composing the data set on the default policy
rules and checking this prediction would be an useful extension of the current
paper.
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4 Political stability
4.1 Introduction
Recent results concerning the distribution model of legislative bargaining with
an endogenous default policy (Kalandrakis 2002, Winschel 2003) predict ex-
tremely instable outcomes. In a simple dynamic model where n politicians
divide an exogenously given budget under the closed agenda and a simple ma-
jority rule, the agenda setter obtains the whole budget after two periods at
most. Yet, we usually do not observe such a discriminatory behavior in a mod-
ern democratic system.
This paper extends the framework above in order to provide an explanation
for the observable lack of discrimination. A simple distributional model reects
only one side of a modern political process, namely legislative bargaining and
coalition formation. The other crucial side of a representative democratic system
is absent: voters and an election mechanism are not modeled.
This paper introduces risk averse voters into a dynamic redistribution model
with the endogenous default policy given by the policy last implemented. I
investigate the following political game: at the rst stage voters elect the agenda
setter among a group of politicians. At the second stage the agenda setter
proposes an allocation of the budget and all other politicians vote. If a simple
majority of politicians support the proposal then it is implemented. Otherwise
the default policy is implemented. This game is repeated innitely and all
politicians stay for ever in o¢ ce. This reects an empirical observation that
usually only the political leadership is changed (namely the agenda rights) but
the majority of people in politics stay for considerably long time and political
parties stay even longer. The reason for this situation, not explicitly modelled,
can be that the reelection of politicians is costly for voters or that there is
uncertainty concerning preferences and abilities of new, unknown candidates.
I compare this game with the benchmark scenario which represents an ideal
situation: voters can reelect their representatives in each period.
The main idea of the paper is that the extreme budget allocation is un-
desirable for risk averse voters. Rational voters should then coordinate their
strategies and restrict policy proposals in order to obtain the stable budget
allocation. Stability is dened as an absence of cycling majorities and discrim-
ination against single groups in favor of all others. Full stability yields the
symmetric allocation of the budget in all periods.
I assume that the politicians are risk neutral while the voters are risk averse.
The idea that the politicians are on average less risk averse than the general
population goes back to Tullock. In The Politics of Bureaucracy (1967) he em-
phasizes how the internal political structure of any organization is manifested
in promoting policies that will systematically emphasize certain personal char-
acteristics while discouraging others. He observes, for example, that successful
politicians will tend to exhibit below average levels of personal integrity sim-
ply as a result of the process through which they achieve their positions. Daly
(1981) develops Tullock ideas further. He describes the political process as a
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series of winner takes all contests and concludes that not only the political
system tends to promote less risk averse individuals, but the potential suppliers
of politiciansservices are, on average, likely to be less risk averse than the pub-
lic they seek to represent. In other words, a self-selection process takes place
in the market for political candidates. Recently, Fatas, Neugebauer and Tam-
borero (2004) tested this hypothesis in the experimental study using real-world
politicians as subjects. They found out that politicians appear to be less risk
averse than student subjects. Moreover, this hypothesis can be supported by
the following observation: politicians tend to be older, more a­ uent, white and
male than their electorate. Assuming non linear utility function, it implies that
politicians may be less risk averse just because they have higher than average
income and wealth. Moreover, there is evidence that men are less risk averse
than women (see Hartog et al. 2002).
My objective is to determine the most stable budget allocation that can be
sustained as an equilibrium allocation via a simple trigger strategy. In order to
avoid the situation when nearly any allocation can be supported in the equi-
librium I do not consider punishments where subsets of voters are punished by
other voters. Instead, I concentrate on punishments which imply a return to a
non-cooperative strategy in the future. It can be justied by the assumption
that the vote is secret; i.e., only the outcome of the vote but not the actions of
individual voters are observable.
The main results of the paper are as follows: coordination among voters
can explain observed stability. I show that full outcome stability is not possible
and the limit to outcome stability is characterized. The limit is achieved under
full political stability in the following sense: the same player is elected as the
agenda setter during the whole game. Moreover, the agenda setter invites the
same players to join the coalition in each period. Political mobility in the sense
that di¤erent politicians obtain agenda rights and/or participate in the coalition,
comes at the cost of stability. On the contrary, in the ideal situation when all
politicians can be reelected, the symmetric budget allocation can be supported
under full political mobility.
This work is closely related to the paper by Artale and Grüner (2000). The
main result is very similar: the theory of repeated games provides a straightfor-
ward explanation for political stability. But the frameworks in the two papers
are quite di¤erent. In contrast to the redistributional model investigated in the
current paper, Artale and Grüner (2000) consider a two-dimensional political
space. Moreover, in their model the politicians are purely power-seeking and
new politicians appear each period, so their behavior is myopic by denition.
As a consequence, Artale and Grüner (2000) have no results concerning how
the cooperation among voters can inuence the dynamic behavior of politicians
and the pattern of political mobility.
This paper is also related to Epple and Riordan (1987). They consider
repeated majority voting with an exogenous default policy and show that a
wide range of budget allocations can be sustained as equilibria by the threat of
political banishment. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show a similar result. In their
paper the budget is allocated only once, terminating the game.
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In the next section I present the model. In Section 4.3 I describe the equi-
librium of the political game when no election is held. In Section 4.4 I consider
the main election mechanism: the election is held periodically and voters elect
the agenda setter among politicians. In Section 4.5 I introduce the benchmark
scenario. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model
In this section I extend the framework, discussed in Winschel (2004), by adding
voters and specifying an election mechanism.
4.2.1 Preferences
The political system consists out of the set of politicians N = f1; :::; ng where
n  5 and an odd number. The politicians are to allocate a unit of a perfectly
divisible cake in each period. Let X denote the set of feasible allocations in
each period, that is, X =

x 2 <n+ :
P
n
i=1x
i
t = 1
	
, where xit denotes the payo¤
for politician i at period t.
Each politician has a linear utility function that depends on her payo¤ only
and discounts the future by a common discount factor  < 1:
W i =
1X
=0
xi (1)
Each politician represents some district populated by homogenous voters. I
assume, for simplicity, that the coordination problem is solved inside the district
so that each districts population acts as one single player. Further, I assume
that all districts are of an equal size. Voters in each district have a common
von Neumann Morgerstern utility function which is concave and monotonically
increasing in budget share xit. Voters discount future by a common discount
factor  < 1:
U i =
1X
=0
U
 
xi

; U 0
 
xi

> 0; U 00
 
xi

< 0 (2)
If the budget is allocated only once then the myopic interests of the popu-
lation are the same as of their representatives: their utility is increasing in the
budget share. But, in contrast to the risk neutral politicians, voters are risk
averse and hence may have di¤erent preferences in the dynamic framework.
4.2.2 Timing
Consider the temporal sequence within each period t: To simplify the discussion I
divide each period t into two stages denoted as the voting stage and the political
stage. Briey, the temporal sequence is as follows:
1. Voting stage: voters elect the agenda setter among the given set of politi-
cians.
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2. Political stage:
(a) the agenda setter elected during the voting stage proposes an alloca-
tion,
(b) all politicians cast a vote for or against the proposed allocation,
(c) if a simple majority of the politicians accepts the proposal, it is im-
plemented, otherwise the default policy is implemented.
This game is repeated innitely. Each district life and each politicians life
are endless.
More detailed, during the voting stage at the beginning of each period the
election takes place and voters have to take a decision. Abstention is not al-
lowed. In each period voters from all districts simultaneously vote on an agenda
setter. Remember that each districts population acts as one single player, so I
assume that each district has one vote. Each district can cast a vote for their
own representative, as well as for any other. The winner of the election is the
politician who obtains the most votes, and subsequently he is elected as the
agenda setter. If two or more politicians tie for the rst place then each wins
with equal probability.
After the election stage, the political stage takes place. It is played as follows:
rst the agenda setter, elected at the voting stage, proposes an allocation in X,
xt. Then all politicians simultaneously respond by either accepting or rejecting
the proposal. The decision rule in each period is a simple majority rule. So, if
at least n+12 politicians support the proposal xt in period t, it is implemented.
Otherwise, the endogenous default policy is implemented, which is the allocation
in X that was implemented in the previous period, namely xt 1. x0 2 X is the
default policy in the rst period and is given exogenously.
4.2.3 Strategies and equilibrium concept
Let ht denote the history at time t. A feasible action for player i at date
t is denoted by ait (ht). Whenever a player is to take an action, she knows
what history has occurred, the rules of the game and the preferences of other
players; so the game is one of perfect information. The feasible action for voters
from each district is at(ht) 2 fi 2 Ng. When politician i is the agenda setter,
ait (ht) 2 X denotes the proposal o¤ered by i at date t, when the history is ht.
When politician i is not the agenda setter, ait (ht) 2 faccept; rejectg denotes the
decision rule by i at date t. I denote the politicians who support the proposal as
coalition members. Strategy si for player i is a sequence of actions

ait (ht)
	1
t=1
,
and the strategy prole s is an 2n-tuple of strategies, one for each politician and
for each district.
The equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. My ob-
jective is to determine the most stable allocation that can be sustained as an
equilibrium allocation via a simple trigger strategy. Stability is dened as an
absence of cycling majorities and discrimination against single groups in favor
of all others. Voters cooperate and coordinate their strategies in order to induce
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the stable budget allocation. They also punish deviations from the cooperative
behavior. In order to avoid the situation when nearly any allocation can be
supported in the equilibrium I, as in Artale and Grüner (2000), do not consider
punishments where subsets of voters are punished by other voters. Instead,
I concentrate on punishments which consist of returning to a non-cooperative
strategy in the future.
For simplicity I consider only the symmetric initial default policy: xi0 =
1
n ; 8i, so I can rephrase that a stable allocation induces a minimal deviation
from the initial symmetric payo¤ vector in each period. Then I can state that
a maximal degree of outcome stability is achieved if the following function,
denoted by L (xt), is minimized in each period:
L (xt) =
nX
j=1

1
n
  xjt
2
8t (3)
s:t:
nX
j=1
xjt = 1
Given the budget constraint, function L (xt) is minimized under the sym-
metric allocation and maximized under the extreme allocation (xit = 1; x
j
t = 0
8j 6= i). Then, for any two allocations xt and xt, if L (xt) > (<)L (xt ) then
allocation xt is less (more) stable than allocation xt .
As it is standard in the literature, I do not consider the equilibrium strategy
prole where no player (a district or a politician) deviates just because he is
not pivotal and does not inuence the decision. Otherwise any allocation can
be sustained as an equilibrium.
4.3 Game without elections
Suppose that there are no voters. Politicians play the following repeated game:
preferences and payo¤s of politicians are the same as in Section 2.1, timing
of the game and feasible strategies are identical to the timing and strategies
of the political stage in Section 2.2. The agenda setter is chosen randomly in
the beginning of each period. This game is investigated in detail in Winschel
(2004). I focus on a particular class of equilibria called stationary in which the
past history inuences the current play only through its e¤ect on a state vari-
able that summarizes the direct e¤ect of the past on the current environment,
or, alternatively, the strategies depend only on the payo¤-relevant information.
Then a player chooses a history-independent strategy in each strategically iden-
tical subgame. In this game, any two subgames with identical default policies
are strategically identical. Using this specic type of equilibrium I rule out a
possible punishment strategy prole which typically leads to a multiplicity of
subgame perfect equilibria (see Baron and Ferejohn (1989)). I will provide just
the summary of the results which are useful for the current paper.
To begin with, I dene the minimal winning coalition (MWC).
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Denition 1 The agenda setter forms the MWC if any coalition member is
an element of MWC, where MWC  N is a nonempty set which satises
i. jMWCj = n 12
ii. 8 j 2MWC xjt = min
nbxjt 2 xt ajt (xt 1; xt) = accepto
8 j =2MWC xjt = 0
iii. 8l 2MWC and 8k =2MWC : Pxjt
j2MWCnflg
+ xkt 
P
xjt
j2MWC
where xkt = min
bxkt 2 xt akt (xt 1; xt) = accept	
Thus, in each period the agenda setter chooses exactly n 12 coalition mem-
bers among the cheapest to buy and proposes the minimal payo¤ so that coali-
tion members are indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the proposal.
Thus, in each period the agenda setter chooses exactly n 12 coalition members
such that the sum of coalition payments which induce the proposal acceptance
is minimal.
Next, I dene the MWC strategy prole:
Denition 2 The MWC strategy prole is dened as follows: let i 2 N
denote the agenda setter in period t.
1. For each player j the decision rule in period t is as follows:
accept the proposal xt i¤
xjt + V
j
t+1 (xt)  xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1) ; for all j 2 N; j 6= i; (4)
where the LHS is the expected utility of coalition member j if he accepts the
proposal xjt , and the RHS is his expected utility if he rejects. V
j
t+1 (xt) denotes
the continuation value of player j when the default policy in period t + 1 is
vector xt. It is dened recursively as
V jt+1 (xt) = E
h
xjt+1 (xt) + V
j
t+2 (xt+1)
i
:
2. The agenda setter forms the MWC and coalition payo¤s are
x jt =max
h
 V jt+1 (xt) + xjt 1 + V jt+1 (xt 1)

; 0
i
8 j 2MWC (5)
The following proposition is from Winschel (2004)
Proposition 4 ( from Winschel 2004) For n  5 the MWC strategy
prole is the equilibrium.
Proof. See the paper.
The following corollary follows from the calculation of the equilibrium pay-
o¤s:
Corollary 1 (i) After at most two periods the MWC payo¤s are extreme:
the agenda setter obtains the whole budget.
(ii) In all periods the payo¤ of the agenda setter is higher than the payo¤ of
any other player.
(iii) If the default payo¤ of player j is zero, then he supports the MWC
proposal even if his payo¤ is zero.
(iiii) If there are two players l; k 2 N such that xkt 1 = xlt 1, the agenda
setter includes them into the coalition in period t with equal probabilities.
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4.4 Limit to stability
In this section I analyze the game introduced in section 2. As I have already
mentioned, my objective is to determine the most stable allocation that can
be sustained as an equilibrium allocation through a simple trigger strategy. In
other words, I want to determinate the limit to stability. I concentrate on
punishments which consist of returning to a non-cooperative strategy in the
future and I do not consider punishments where subsets of voters are punished
by other voters.
To begin with, I characterize the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy pro-
le. In this case the playersstrategies are restricted to stationary strategies.
Then I, rstly, introduce the trigger strategy prole. Secondly, I construct the
payo¤s which are compatible with this trigger strategy prole being an equilib-
rium of the dynamic game. Thirdly, I show that the proposed trigger strategy
prole yields maximal available stability of the allocation. Fourthly, I show that
voters indeed prot from the cooperation compared with non-cooperation.
4.4.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider the case where voters do not cooperate. Then they prefer to vote for
the candidate from their own district:
Proposition 1 The following strategy prole is an equilibrium: voters al-
ways vote for their representative and politicians play according to the MWC
strategy prole.
Proof. Assume that all players play according to the strategy described
in the proposition. Then all politicians obtain the same amount of votes and
the agenda setter is elected randomly. According to Proposition 4 (Winschel
2004), the equilibrium strategies of politicians are identical to the MWC strategy
prole.
Consider now one period deviation of some district: voters from district i
vote for representative j 6= i. Then j is certainly elected to be the agenda setter
and proposes according to the MWC strategy. In all subsequent periods all
districts vote again for their representatives. It is obvious that the deviation is
costly for district i, because the payo¤ of the agenda setter and his district is
the highest compared to other politicians and districts (see Corollary 1).
The question arises if voters can prot from the deviation. The potentially
protable deviation is possible only in the rst period: if the voters deviate they
have a higher probability that their representative will be a coalition member
in the next period. The su¢ cient condition for non-deviation is:
U

1  n  1
2
n  
n2

 1
2

U

n  
n2

+ 
1
n
U

1
n

+


n2 + 1
2n2
  1
2n

U (0) > 0
This condition is easily satised, especially for large n, if voters are not
extremely risk averse and U (0) is non-negative. I assume that this is the case.
In all other periods voters will never prot from the deviation due to the
extreme allocation: all coalition members will support the MWC proposal for a
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zero payo¤. If in period t > 1 politician j is chosen as the agenda setter, district
i, which supported j rather than their own representative, looses in the current
period and does not gain anything in future periods (for details see Appendix).
It may be not the unique equilibrium, but it is the simplest and the most
intuitive one. In addition, the strategy prole where voters vote for their rep-
resentative and politicians play according to the MWC strategy, is an unique
equilibrium of the one period game.
Now I have to calculate the MWC payo¤s and utilities. Denote the agenda
setter by i, the coalition by J  N with typical coalition member j and the
opposition by L  N with typical opposition member l. After two periods
an allocation is always extreme and the agenda setter obtains the whole bud-
get. The expected utility of the agenda setter in the rst period from playing
according to the MWC strategy is (for details see Appendix)
EW i = 1  n  1
2
1
n2
(n  ) +
1X
=1

1
n
: (6)
The expected utility of a coalition member in the rst period is
EW j =
1
n2
(n  ) + 

1
n
+
1
n2

+
1X
=2

1
n
=
1
n
+
1X
=1

1
n
: (7)
The expected utility of an opposition member in the rst period is
EW l = 0 + 
1
n

1  1
n

+
1X
=2

1
n
: (8)
4.4.2 The trigger strategy
In this section I introduce the trigger strategy. I denote the strategy prole
which yields the most stable outcomes as the SP (stable payo¤s) strategy prole
and payo¤s which are generated by the SP strategy prole as SP payo¤s. I also
use the terms the SP allocation, which is the vector of SP payo¤s, and the SP
proposal which is the shortcut to the agenda setter proposes the SP allocation.
Consider the following strategy of players:
Denition 3 voters and politicians play according to the SP strategy if they
behave as follows:
1. In the rst period :
(i) All voters vote for their representative
(ii) The agenda setter is selected randomly and proposes the SP allocation.
In all consequent periods:
2. If the policy implemented in the last period is consistent with the SP
allocation:
(i) All voters vote for the rst period agenda setter.
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(ii) If the rst period agenda setter is chosen as the agenda setter, she
proposes the SP allocation.
(iii) If any other politician is chosen as the agenda setter, he proposes the
MWC allocation.
3. If the implemented policy in the last period is not consistent with the SP
allocation
(i) voters vote for their own representative.
(ii) the agenda setter is chosen randomly and proposes the MWC allocation.
4. Politicians always vote sincerely for the alternative they prefer.
Note, that voters will switch to the punishment strategy only if the im-
plemented allocation is not consistent with the SP allocation and not if some
players do not play according to SP strategy prole. The interpretation is that
voters are interested only in the actually implemented allocation and not in the
details of the political process.
Next I will construct the payo¤s which are compatible with the SP strategy
being an equilibrium of the dynamic game and will show that the SP strategy
yields maximal stability of the allocation.
I again denote the agenda setter by i, the coalition by J  N with typi-
cal coalition member j and the opposition by L  N with typical opposition
member l. The SP payo¤ of player k is denoted as xkSP .
Election of the agenda setter In this section I show that in order to achieve
maximal available stability, the same politician has to be elected as the agenda
setter in all periods.
Note that playing according to the MWC strategy, the agenda setter allo-
cates the highest payo¤ to herself, and the MWC equilibrium is characterized
by an extreme allocation after at most two periods. Then, with a more stable
allocation than the MWC allocation, the payo¤ of the agenda setter decreases.
As a result, if voters want a more stable proposal, they need to compensate
the agenda setter. This can only be done by inuencing her chances to be the
agenda setter in the future. As a result, if voters want to achieve maximal
stability they have to elect the same agenda setter each period:
Lemma 1 Maximal allocation stability is achieved if the same player is
always reelected as the agenda setter.
Proof. The agenda setters expected utility under the SP strategy prole
has to be at least as high as the expected utility from playing according to the
MWC strategy.
In each period, the agenda setters payo¤ from playing according to the
MWC strategy is higher than the payo¤ of any other politician. Together with
the budget constraint it implies that xit >
1
n 8t. Moreover, if the agenda setter
proposes the MWC allocation, then her expected utility is higher than 1n
1P
=1
 .
In order to compensate the agenda setter for not deviating from the SP proposal
her SP payo¤ has to guarantee that xiSP >
1
n . This implies that x
i
SP > x
k
SP ,
k 2 N , k 6= i. Thus, the players expected utility increases in the probability to
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be the agenda setter in future periods. The conclusion is rather trivial: if one
player is always reelected as the agenda setter, her SP payo¤, which guarantees
non deviation, is minimal and results in a larger budget to be allocated among
other players and, hence, results in higher outcome stability.
Coalition composition In this section I construct the coalition and calculate
SP coalition payo¤s in a way that maximal stability of the allocation is achieved.
In order to discuss coalition memberspayo¤s, two issues are to be consid-
ered. First the coalition composition: either the SP proposal has to be supported
by the stable coalition, in the sense that the same politicians are included into
the coalition in each period, or there is a possibility for a coalition members
rotation. If payo¤s to coalition members and opposition members are di¤erent,
it will be less discriminating if there is a rotation among coalition members.
Second, the coalition size has to be considered.
Suppose that all players play according to the SP strategy. Moreover, sup-
pose that a coalition members rotation exists. Then each politician can be
a coalition member with some probability less than one, denoted by pck for
politician k. Note, that maximal allocation stability requires equal coalition
and opposition payo¤s for all coalition and opposition members respectively:
xl1SP = x
l2
SP 8l1; l2 2 L and xj1SP = xj2SP 8j1; j2 2 J . According to Lemma 1, the
payo¤ of the agenda setter is higher than 1n in each period. Together with the
budget constraint it implies that ExkSP = x
l
SP (1  pck) + xjSP pck < 1n . Hence,
if there is a coalition members rotation, the expected payo¤ in each period for
all politicians is lower than 1n , apart from the agenda setter. All politicians
vote sincerely for the alternative which guarantees the highest expected utility,
so they would never support the SP proposal in the rst period because their
expected utility from switching to the MWC strategy prole, given the initial
default policy, is 1n
1P
=1
 . Then the SP allocation has to yield the expected
utility at least 1n
1P
=1
 for each coalition member. From this reasoning it follows
directly that the coalition composition has to be stable. Thus, if we want to
achieve maximal stability, the payo¤ for each coalition member has to be 1n in
all periods. This is a minimal payo¤ which guarantees the acceptance of the SP
proposal in the rst period. In all later periods the default policy of coalition
members equals 1n and all coalition members will support the SP proposal.
Consider now the coalition size. It is obvious that the coalition should con-
sists of n 12 members: this maximizes the surplus which can be distributed
among the opposition.
The result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 the SP strategy prole can be supported as the equilibrium and
yields maximal output stability i¤ :
(i) the coalition consists of n 12 members,
(ii) the payo¤ to a coalition member equals to 1n in each period,
(iii) the coalition composition is stable.
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Equilibrium payo¤s Having described the way the coalition is constructed,
I can calculate how the rest of the budget is allocated between the agenda
setter and opposition members. The payo¤s are derived from the agenda setters
incentive constraints. As I argued above, the agenda setter has to obtain at least
the same expected utility as under the MWC strategy in all periods. Hence, we
need to consider two incentives constrains: one for the rst period, when the
default policy is symmetric, and the other one for all consequent periods, when
the default policy is the SP allocation
 
xiSP ;
1
n ; x
l
SP

.
The incentive constraint for the rst period is
W iSP =

1  n  1
2
1
n
  n  1
2
xlSP
 1X
=0
 
 1  n  1
2
1
n2
(n  ) +
1X
=1

1
n
= EW iMWC ; (9)
and for all other periods is
W iSP =

1  n  1
2n
  n  1
2
xlSP
 
1 +
1X
=1

!
 1 +
1X
=1

1
n
= EW iMWC
(10)
In order to support the SP strategy prole as an equilibrium strategy prole,
an opposition members payo¤ has to satisfy the following condition (for the
details see Appendix)
xlSP 
2   1
n
: (11)
In order to obtain maximal output stability the payo¤ for an opposition member
has to be equal to xlt =
2 1
n .
Summarizing the results:
Proposition 2 Suppose that voters play according to the SP strategy. Then
the SP strategy prole can be
(1) supported as the equilibrium of the cooperation game and (2) yields max-
imal output stability i¤
(i)  > 0:5.
(ii) It is characterized by the following payo¤s:
xiSP = 1 
n  1
2
1
n
  n  1
2
2   1
n
=
n (1  ) + 
n
xjSP =
1
n
xlSP =
2   1
n
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Proof. follows directly from the construction of the payo¤s.
This proposition implies that full stability
 
xkSP =
1
n ; 8k 2 N

cannot be
achieved.
Comparing the results with the MWC expected utilities we see that the
agenda setter i is better o¤ under the SP
EW iMWC W iSP = 1 
n  1
2
1
n2
(n  )+ 
1  
1
n
 


1   + 1

n (1  ) + 
n
=
=  1
2
n2   n  n+ 
n2
< 0; (12)
coalition members are indi¤erent
EW jMWC  W jSP =
1
n2
(n  ) +  1
n2
+

1  
1
n
  1
n
  
1  
1
n
= 0; (13)
and opposition members loose
EW lMWC  W lSP =  

n2
+

1  
1
n
  2   1
n
  
1  
2   1
n
= (14)
=
1
n2
(n  ) > 0:
Ex ante, prior to the identities of the agenda setter and coalition members are
known, the politicians are indi¤erent between cooperative and non cooperative
equilibria.
Voters Till now it was only an assumption, that voters cooperate in order
to reduce discrimination. The following Lemma veries that there are benets
from this political consensus:
Lemma 3 Assume that voters are risk averse. Then the following is true:
(i) ex ante, before the identities of the agenda setter and coalition members
are known, all voters prefer the SP allocation over the MWC allocation,
(ii) ex post the majority of voters prefer the SP payo¤s,
(iii) if risk aversion is strong enough, all voters prefer the SP payo¤s ex post.
Proof. (i) Follows from the fact that the ex ante distribution of the SP
payo¤s, compared to the MWC payo¤s, is a mean preserving spread with a
lower variance.
(ii) Voters from the agenda setters district obviously prefer the SP payo¤s:
they obtain a deterministic payo¤which is higher than the expected payo¤under
the MWC. Voters from the coalition districts obtain a deterministic payo¤which
is equal to the MWC expected payo¤. Together they form a majority.
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(iii) Voters from the opposition districts obtain a payo¤ which is lower than
the expected payo¤ under the MWC but they bear no risk. If risk aversion is
strong enough, they prefer the SP allocation.
Lemma 3 states that a restricted political competition is ex ante desirable
from the voterspoint of view, which guarantees participation. Ex post it is de-
sirable for at least the majority of voters, which guarantees the implementation
of the SP allocation in all periods.
4.4.3 Limited political competition
In the previous section I concentrated on the most stable allocation that can
be sustained as an equilibrium allocation and I calculated the limit to outcome
stability. The main problem concerning these results is an absolute absence
of political competition: the agenda rights and the coalition composition are
completely stable which contradicts to what we observe in reality. In this section
I consider an equilibrium which incorporates some limited political mobility and
show that it can be introduced only at the expense of outcome stability.
Political mobility can be introduced in two di¤erent manners: via coalition
members rotation and through the agenda setters rotation. To start with, note
that the coalition non-rotation result depends on the symmetric default policy
assumption. By voting against the agenda setters proposal in the rst period,
all politicians obtain an expected payo¤ 1n in each period. If the initial allocation
is not symmetric this does not have to be the case. The coalition members
rotation is also possible if the following conditions are satised:
Lemma 4 Consider allocation

xiSP ; x
j
SP ; x
l
SP

described in Proposition 2.
Suppose that starting from the second period each politician can be a coalition
member with some probability less than one, denoted by pck for politician k,
k 6= i. Then this allocation can be supported as a SP equilibrium with the
coalition members rotation if
(i) The following condition is satised:
x iSP
1X
=1

1
n
  1 MWCi(x0)+ 1X
=1

1
n
; (15)
where MWCi(x) is the cost of the MWC coalition given the default policy
x if the agenda setter is player i.
(ii) In the rst period there are at least n 12 players whose expected utility
from the MWC is weakly lower than the expected utility under the SP.
(iii) In the rst period the agenda setter and coalition members are chosen
in such a way that (i) and (ii) are satised.
Proof. (i) This condition guarantees that the agenda setter does not deviate
in the rst period. The utility from the SP proposal is higher than the expected
utility from the MWC. In the later periods the SP payo¤s are the equilibrium
payo¤s due to the construction, identical to the one in the previous section.
(ii) At least the majority of politicians have to support the allocation in the
rst period. If the SP proposal in the rst period is rejected by the coalition,
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then in the next period a non-cooperative game is played. Coalition member k
supports the SP proposal in the rst period if
xjSP +
1X
=1


pckx
j
SP + p
c
kx
l
SP

 xk0 + V kMWC (x0) ; (16)
where V kMWC (x0) is ks continuation value if the MWC strategy is played in all
periods, given the initial default policy.
In the rst period the agenda setter proposes the SP allocation and invites
into the coalition n 12 politicians for whom condition (19) is satised. Then the
SP allocation is accepted. In the later periods the SP payo¤s are the equilibrium
payo¤s due to the construction, identical to the one in the previous section.
(iii) obvious.
The main di¤erence from the symmetric default policy case, where these
conditions are not satised, is that in the rst period the agenda setter and
coalition members may not necessarily be picked randomly from the general
population but chosen from some subgroup of the politicians.
In the following example the initial default policy is such that all condi-
tions from Lemma 4 are satised and the SP allocation can be supported as an
equilibrium allocation:
Example 1 Consider the following initial default policy: one player obtains
the whole budget and all the others obtain zero. Then the SP payo¤s as described
in Proposition 2 can be supported as equilibrium payo¤s with the coalition mem-
bers rotation if the agenda setter is chosen randomly but the coalition in the rst
period has to consist of the players with the default policy zero.
The alternative way to extend the model for limited political competition
is the agenda setters rotation. One can construct an equilibrium where several
players replace each other in the role of the agenda setter. Consider the sym-
metric initial default policy. Suppose that two politicians replace each other
in subsequent periods as the agenda setter. The coalition payo¤s are 1n each
period and there is no coalition members rotation. The agenda setters payo¤
is calculated from the two non-deviation conditions for the rst and for further
periods, as in the previous section. Such an agenda setters rotation implies
lower payo¤s for opposition members, but when voters are su¢ cient risk averse
they can still be better o¤ compared with non cooperation. Moreover, one can
mix these two approaches and obtain limited rotation among the agenda setters
as well as in the coalition.
This section shows that for some specic initial default policies the coalition
members rotation can be introduced without reducing outcome stability. But
for the arbitrary default policy one should expect a lower outcome stability if
the coalition is not stable. Some limited political mobility in the agenda setting
can be introduced only at the expense of outcome stability.
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4.5 Ideal scenario: reelection of all politicians
In this section I introduce an ideal voting scenario: voters can reelect their
representatives in each period. I will show that voters can induce symmetric
payo¤s in each period if they coordinate their strategies.
The preferences and payo¤s of all players, politicians as well as voters, are
described in section 2.1. The temporal sequence within single period t is as
follows:
1. Voting stage:voters in each district elect their representative (one per dis-
trict),
(a) voters in each district elect their representative, one per district,
(b) the agenda setter is elected randomly among n politicians elected in
(a).
2. Political stage:
(a) the agenda setter, elected during the voting stage, proposes an allo-
cation,
(b) all politicians vote for or against the proposed allocation,
(c) if a simple majority of politicians accepts the proposal, it is imple-
mented, otherwise the default policy is implemented.
During the voting stage, each district elects their own representative in each
period. All districts act simultaneously. After the election has taken place,
the agenda setter is chosen randomly7 . The feasible action for the voter is
at(ht) 2 freelect an old representative, elect a new representative}. I assume
that in each district there is always a large pool of identical potential politicians,
and once out of the o¢ ce the representative cannot be reelected again. The
political stage is described in section 2.2.
This game is innitely repeated. Each voters life is endless. Each politicians
life starts in the period when he is elected and ends in the period when he is
replaced by a new representative. Note that each politicians life may be endless
if he is always reelected.
4.5.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
If voters can reelect their representatives they can inuence the political process
even without coordinating their strategies by threatening not to reelect their
representative. As a result, they may generally achieve a higher allocation
stability, compared to the MWC. Nevertheless, in the absence of cooperation it
is impossible to support the symmetric allocation as an equilibrium allocation,
even if voters are extreme risk averse:
7 I could add the election of the agenda setter as well, but it would not change the results.
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Lemma 5 In the absence of cooperation the payo¤ prole xkt =
1
n 8k 2 N;8t
cannot be the equilibrium payo¤.
Proof. Suppose that there is such an equilibrium, where the agenda setter
proposes xkt =
1
n8k 2 N , 8t, the majority of politicians supports this proposal
and all politicians are reelected by their districts.
Suppose that agenda setter i deviates and proposes the MWC allocation in
period t. In all consequent periods the equilibrium strategy is played. In this
case is payo¤ in period t is 1  n 12n > 1n . Her district prots from the deviation
and coalition membersdistricts are indi¤erent. As a result, i is reelected and
prots from the deviation. Hence, the proposed strategy prole cannot be an
equilibrium.
4.5.2 The trigger strategy
According to Denition 1, the ideal situation for voters is a symmetric payo¤s
vector in each period. In this section I aim to investigate if voters can achieve
such stability via cooperation.
Dene the SP strategy as follows:
Denition 4 voters and politicians play the SP strategy if they behave as
follows:
1. In each period the agenda setter proposes symmetric allocation xkt =
1
n8k 2 N;8t:
2. If the implemented policy in the last period is the symmetric allocation,
voters reelect their representatives.
3. If the implemented policy in the last period is not the symmetric allocation,
voters elect new representatives and all players play according to strategy a
which is an equilibrium of a non-cooperative game.
4. Politicians always vote sincerely for the alternative they prefer.
The punishment strategy prole a can be any strategy prole which con-
stitutes the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. As shown in Lemma 5 no
such equilibrium prole can induce the symmetric payo¤s vector.
If the agenda setter deviates from the equilibrium strategy, she faces the in-
evitable reelection8 . Then she considers the deviation period as the last period
of the game and makes the MWC proposal. Moreover, the agenda setter has to
compensate coalition members for not being reelected.
If the allocation is symmetric in all periods then each politicians utility is
WSP =
1
n
+
1
n

1   : (17)
Hence, this is also the payo¤ that the agenda setter has to pay to any coali-
tion member if she makes the MWC proposal. Then she obtains:
8 I consider only the situation when, deviating, the agenda setter proposes an allocation
which is accepted. The situation when the allocation is rejected and all players are reelected
again is possible but not interesting.
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W iMWC = 1 
n  1
2

1
n
+
1
n

1  

=
1
2
n (1  2) + 1
n (1  ) : (18)
The agenda setter deviates if
W iMWC  W iSP =
1
2
n (1  2) + 1
n (1  )  
1
n
  1
n

1   = (19)
=
1
2
n (1  2)  1
n (1  ) > 0
)  < 1
2
n  1
n
: (20)
If   12 n 1n the agenda setter will never deviate. Coalition members will
always support the symmetric allocation, because if they deviate they obtain
the same payo¤. As a result, the symmetric allocation can be supported as the
equilibrium allocation.
This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The symmetric allocation can be supported as an equilibrium
allocation of the cooperative game if all politicians can be reelected and  
1
2
n 1
n .
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper I follow Artale and Grüner (2000) and show how the theory of
repeated games provides a straightforward explanation for political stability
in a di¤erent framework. By coordinating their actions, voters can induce a
stable political outcome in the model which is otherwise characterized by an
extreme instability. I dened stability as a minimal deviation from the initial
symmetric payo¤ vector or, in other words, as minimal discrimination against
some population groups.
The main conclusion of the paper is that maximal outcome stability is
achieved under the highest political stability meaning a permanent agenda setter
and a stable coalition. Political mobility in the agenda setting or/and the coali-
tion can be introduced at the expense of outcome stability. Since the agenda
setter and the coalition are chosen arbitrary in the beginning of the game, the
political stability induces the persistence of di¤erent political outcomes in oth-
erwise similar countries.
In a certain sense I have obtained controversial results: the goal of voters
cooperation is to minimize discrimination, but, as a consequence, persistent,
though not extreme, discrimination takes place in favor of some groups. This
result introduces a trade-o¤between static discrimination and dynamic stability:
the absence of extreme discrimination in one particular period turns out to be
at the cost of permanent inequality in the dynamic framework. A society where
voters cooperate secures stability but implies that some groups are permanently
worse o¤ than others. A society without cooperation produces extreme dynamic
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instability but equal chances for the whole population. Further research is
required to clarify this trade o¤, in particular a more complicated model which
could reect aspects of the political process in more detail.
An interesting observation is that under the benchmark ideal democracy,
where all politicians can be costlessly reelected in each period such a trade-
o¤ does not arise: full outcome stability is easily achieved under full political
mobility and does not imply permanent discrimination. Then the costs induced
by the trade-o¤ between stability and equal chances can be the result of failures
in the political process.
The model suggests the following empirical predictions: a higher political
stability induces less discrimination and more stable political outcomes. The
verication of this prediction would be an useful extension of the current paper.
4.6.1 Appendix
4.6.2 Appendix to Section 4.4.1
First, I calculate the MWC payo¤s.
In period two, if the agenda setter is the player with a zero payo¤ in the rst
period, she allocates a positive payo¤ only to one rst period coalition member.
According to (4), such payo¤ has to satisfy:
xj2 + 
1
n
+
1
n
1X
=2
  xj1 + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2
n  1x
j
2

+
1
n
1X
=2
 : (21)
From this condition together with (5) it follows that
xj2 = x
j
1
n
n   : (22)
The rst period coalition payo¤ xj1 has to satisfy the following condition:
xj1 + 

1
n
+
1
n
xj2

+
1
n
1X
=2
  1
n
+ 

1
n

1  n  1
2
xj1

+
n  1
n
1
2
xj1

+
+2

1
n

1  n  1
2n
xj2

+
n  1
2n2
xj2

+
1
n
1X
=3
 ; (23)
) xj1 + 
1
n
x2  1
n
;
and, according to (5),
) xj1 =
1
n2
(n  ) ; (24)
and
xj2 = x
j
1
n
n   ) x
j
2 =
1
n2
(n  ) n
n   =
1
n
: (25)
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Then the expected utility of the rst period agenda setter from playing according
to the MWC strategy is
EW i = 1  n  1
2
1
n2
(n  ) +
1X
=1

1
n
: (26)
The expected utility of the rst period coalition member is
EW j =
1
n2
(n  ) + 

1
n
+
1
n2

+
1X
=2

1
n
=
1
n
+
1X
=1

1
n
: (27)
The expected utility of the rst period opposition members is
EW l = 0 + 
1
n

1  1
n

+
1X
=2

1
n
: (28)
Then if all players play according to the MWC strategy in the rst period
then the expected utility of each voter in district i is:
EU i =
1
n

U

1  n  1
2
n  
n2

+ 

1
n
U (1) +
n  1
n
U (0)

+
n  1
2n

U

1
n2
(n  )

+ 

1
n
U (1) +
1
n
U

1
n

+
n  2
n
U (0)

+ (29)
+
n  1
2n

U (0) + 

1
n
U

1  1
n

+
n  1
n
U (0)

+
1X
=2


1
n
U (1) +
n  1
n
U (0)

:
If voters deviate in the rst period then their expected utility is:
EU i =
1
2

U

1
n2
(n  )

+ 

1
n
U (1) +
1
n
U

1
n

+
n  2
n
U (0)

+ (30)
+
1
2

U (0) + 

1
n
U

1  1
n

+
n  1
n
U (0)

+
1X
=2


1
n
U (1) +
n  1
n
U (0)

:
The su¢ cient condition for non-deviation is then
U

1  n  1
2
n  
n2

 1
2

U

n  
n2

+ 
1
n
U

1
n

+


n2 + 1
2n2
  1
2n

U (0) > 0
If voters do not deviate in the second period, then their expected utility is
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:
If voters deviate in the second period, then their expected utility is
EU i =
1
n

U

1  n  1
2
n  
n2

+  (U (0))

+
+
n  1
2n

U

1
n2
(n  )

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
1
n
U

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
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n
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+ (32)
+
n  1
2n
[U (0) +  (U (0))] +
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=2


1
n
U (1) +
n  1
n
U (0)

;
and is strictly lower than the expected utility if they do not deviate. The same
is true for the deviation in any later period.
4.6.3 Appendix to Section 4.2.3
The incentive constrain for the rst period is:
EW iSP =

1  n  1
2
1
n
  n  1
2
xlSP
 1X
=0
 
 1  n  1
2
1
n2
(n  ) +
1X
=1

1
n
= EW iMWC : (33)
Rewriting condition this condition I obtain an expression for the lower bound
on an opposition member payo¤:
1  n  1
2
1
n2
(n  ) + 1
n

1   

1  n  1
2
1
n
  n  1
2
xlSP


1   + 1

)
) xlSP  max

(n  1 + ) 
n2
; 0

= (n  1 + ) 
n2
: (34)
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The next step is to calculate the agenda setters SP payo¤ that prevents her
from deviating in periods t  2. Playing according to the MWC strategy, she
takes into the coalition either SP coalition members or SP opposition members.
Intuitively, such an incentive constrain is stricter than condition (33): the MWC
is cheaper while it includes the players who stay opposition members under the
SP and whose default policy is lower than 1n . It is plausible that they agree to
support the MWC allocation for a lower payo¤ than the SP coalition members.
For now I assume that SP opposition members are invited into the MWC in
period t, namely that xlt  xjt . Later I will check this assumption.
Note, that if any coalition member rejects the proposal made by the agenda
setter, the agenda setter is nevertheless reelected, because the implemented
policy is consistent with the SP allocation.
According to (4), payo¤ xlt for which player l supports the MWC proposal
in period t, t > 1, can be calculated from the following condition:
xlt + 

1
n
+
n  1
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2
n  1x
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
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
1
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n  1x
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
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1X
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
1
n
: (35)
If politician l supports the MWC allocation proposal in period t, then the
punishment strategy is played, and xlt+1 is calculated according to (5):
xlt+1 + 
1
n
= xlt + 

1
n
+
n  1
2n
2
n  1x
l
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
)
) xlt+1 = xlt
n
n   : (36)
Then, substituting for xlt+1 in (35)
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Expression x
l
SPn 
n2(1 ) (n  ) can be negative as well as positive. But if we take
into consideration that from (34) follows that xlSP  (n  1 + ) n2 ; then:
xlt = max
"
(n  1 + ) n2n  
n2 (1  ) (n  ) ; 0
#
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; 0

= 0: (38)
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In other words, opposition members always support the MWC proposal,
even if they obtain a zero payo¤. This means that the agenda setter obtains the
whole budget playing according to the MWC strategy.
Then, the expected utility of the agenda setter if she deviated from the SP
strategy is
EW iMWC = 1 +
1X
=1

1
n
= 1 +
1
n

1   : (39)
In order to prevent the agenda setter from deviation, the following condition
has to be satised:
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n
(40)
It follows that the SP strategy can be supported as an equilibrium only for
 > 0:5.
Finally, I have to check the assumption that xlt  xjt . Suppose that SP
coalition members are included in the MWC, namely that xlt > x
j
t . Then:
xjt+
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)
) xjt =
n  
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> 0 = xlt; (41)
which is a contradiction.
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5 Coalition formation with private information
5.1 Introduction
Minimal winning coalitions appeared as a key prediction of various models of
coalition formation and vote buying (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Denzau and
Munger 1986, Shepsle 1974, Riker 1962). But as an empirical matter, over-
sized coalitions appear at least as prevalent as minimal winning coalitions (see
discussion in Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Diermeier et all (2002, 2003)).
In this paper I propose a new explanation to the supermajority coalition
existence. I investigate whether there are incentives to form a supermajority
coalition in the presence of private information.
The direct explanation of the supermajority existence in an uncertain envi-
ronment is intuitive: it serves to increase the probability of a desirable decision
(Koehler 1972, 1975, Riker 1962). Another possible reason is the norm of univer-
salism (Klingaman 1969, Weingast 1979). Groseclose and Snyder (1996) suggest
that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions if
there is a competition among vote buyers who move sequentially. Diermeier and
Merlo (2000) analysis accounts for surplus and minority governments in a two
periods model of the government formation and termination with a stochastic
default policy. Axelrod (1970) suggests that supermajority coalitions arise when
small, ideologically centrist parties are included to reduce the conict of interest
among parties in the government. Baron and Diermeier (2001) believe that su-
permajority coalitions form when the status quo policy is ideologically extreme.
Crombez (1996) predicts that the largest party will propose an supermajority
coalition when it holds few seats and is ideologically extreme. Carrubba and
Volden (2000) propose that supermajority coalitions come about when policy
logrolls are di¢ cult to achieve and sustain over time. Lijphart (1984) and Sjolin
(1993) argue that supermajority coalitions are formed in order to ensure control
of the upper chamber in bicameral systems9 .
In the current paper I consider the case of coalition formation in the presence
of private information. Consider the following model: some payer who is inter-
ested in the implementation of a particular project tries to inuence a political
body which is responsible for the decision. This player uses private payments in
order to inuence the politicians. Such a player can be an interest group, which
tries to inuence the politicians using illegal bribes or legal campaign contribu-
tions. The alternative interpretation is that this player is the government which
tries to inuence the decision of the parliament or some committee. In this case
the payments can be governmental portfolios or the implementation of other
projects in which the politicians might be interested. Throughout the paper I
will call this player a lobby.
Politicians decide about the implementation of the project by the simple
majority voting rule. In order to make the game interesting, I assume that the
project will not be implemented without the inuence from the lobby. Moreover,
9See Carrubba and Volden (2004) for a summary of theoretical explanations for the super-
majority existence.
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for simplicity, in case there are no private payments, all politicians are better
o¤ if the project is not implemented.
I assume that politicians bear some costs if they accept private payments10 .
Moreover, I assume that politicians di¤er with respect to these costs and that
a politicians cost is his private information. The costs can be interpreted in a
number of ways. Firstly, there is a risk of punishment if the lobbying activity is
illegal. In this case the politician can be punished for obtaining illegal private
payments. Secondly, when private payments take the form of a campaign contri-
bution, a realistic interpretation for costs can be the reduction in the reelection
chances (Prat 2004, Prat, Puglisi and Snyder, Jr. 2005). Thirdly, the costs can
take a form of a private scruple: a politician su¤ers if he is associated with
the undesired decision and obtains a private benet from it.
I investigate the closed voting procedure, advocated by Dal Bo (2004) and
Grüner and Felgenhauer (2003)11 , where the actual vote of a politician cannot
be observed and private payments can be conditioned only on the project im-
plementation. Accordingly, I dene the politicians who obtain positive private
payments as coalition members. The private costs are associated with being
a coalition member and obtaining private benets rather than with the actual
vote. This is di¤erent for opposition members, who lose only from the imple-
mentation of the undesirable project and bear no additional costs.
A good example for this model is the recent political process in Israel, where
some politicians did not want to be included in the coalition in order not to be
associated with the disintegration process, regardless of all other issues. The
following citation introduces the concept of the collective responsibilityand
explains the spirit of my model:
Worst of all is the way the politicians  government ministers, mainly 
think they can have their cake and eat it, too. They want to keep their seats
in a government that voted for the pullout, but without voicing solidarity for
its decisions. They serve in a government that elected to leave Gaza, but they
dont understand that even if they voted no,they are partners in the decision.
Because there is a principle known as collective responsibility. Sharons success
will be their success. Yet no one has come out in defense of Sharon - or in
10The assumption that the politicians have costs while obtaining private payments resembles
a vote related costs assumption in Dal Bo (2006). In his paper, politicians care about how
they vote per se, beside caring about private payments and the nal decision. Under the open
voting rule, where payments are conditioned on a vote, vote related costs are equivalent to
private payments related costs in the current paper.
11Both papers belong to the recent literature that compares open and closed voting rules.
Dal Bo (2004) and Felgenhauer and Grüner (2003) found that under an open rule an outside
party can manipulate the committee decision at very small costs or even at no cost at all. As
a result both papers advocate for a closed voting procedure.
Dal Bo presents a complete information model where all committee members are to some
extent against the approval of the project desired by an interest group.
Felgenhauer and Grüner discuss the case where committee members have private infor-
mation about what might be the best policy. Moreover, they are inuenced by an external
interest group, which favors a certain policy.
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defense of the decision reached by his government, to be more precise. (Silence
of the lambs as Israel burnsYoel Marcus, 01.07.2005 Haaretz).
A part of Sharons government remained government members, receiving all
o¢ ce perks, despite voting against the disintegration plan. But others con-
sidered the damage of the collective responsibility for their future political
carrier as too high and left the government. For example, the nancial minister
and Sharons main rival in the Likud party Benjamin Netanyahu, whose sup-
porters considered the disintegration plan as the opposite to success, left the
government shortly before the disintegrations plan implementation. In other
words, a coalition member cannot simultaneously enjoy private payments asso-
ciated with the coalition membership and the political capital associated with
novote.
The main result of this paper is that if the supermajority coalition is formed,
a credible exchange of information can take place between the lobby and the
politicians. There is a fully revealing equilibrium and the lobby can e¢ ciently
buy the cheapest players. On the contrary, if the lobby forms the minimal
winning coalition, no fully revealing equilibrium is possible.
An additional interesting result is that with an increase in the number of
politicians, a fully revealing equilibrium is more likely to exist and , hence, coali-
tions are more likely to be oversized. Therefore, the possibility of the undesired
projects implementation increases. Thus, the society or representative political
institutions may prefer to reduce the number of politicians in the decision body.
This result contradicts the famous Condorcets jury theorem which states that
the delegation of a decision to a bigger committee yields better results.
This paper is closely related to Tsai and Yang (2006, 2007). In these two
papers Tsai and Yang introduce asymmetric information into the coalition for-
mation models proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (2000) respectively. The main result is that both supermajority
coalitions and minimal winning coalitions may arise in the equilibrium. This
is in contrast to the certain world in which only minimal winning coalitions
appear. But in Tsai and Yang (2006, 2007) there is no possibility of informa-
tion exchange between the players, so the incentives to form the supermajority
coalition are quite di¤erent from the current paper.
The paper is structured in the following way: the next section describes the
model. Section 5.3 considers the complete information case. Section 5.4 dis-
cusses coalition formation under asymmetric information: section 5.4.2 presents
minimal winning coalition and section 5.4.3 investigates the supermajority coali-
tion. Section 5.5 discusses the optimal coalition size. Section 5.6 considers
continuous types. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The model
There is a group of n politicians who decide about the implementation of some
project. Let n be an odd number. The decision rule is a simple majority voting
rule, so the project is implemented if at least n+12 politicians support it. If the
project is not implemented, a default policy takes place.
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Assume that there is some player, called the lobby, who is interested in the
implementation of the project and has the ability to inuence the decision by
proposing private payments to the politicians. I denote the vector of payments
by t, ti  0, where ti is the payment to politician i.
5.2.1 Preferences
The politicians derive utility from either the implemented project or the default
policy as well as from private payments. I assume that all politicians obtain a
utility normalized to zero, if the project is implemented. Otherwise it is equal
to some constant p > 0. Therefore, without additional incentives, all politicians
vote against the project.
I assume that politicians bear some costs if they obtain private payments.
The politicians di¤er with respect to these costs. The cost for politician i is de-
noted by di and is distributed independently on the interval [dL; dH ] according
to some distribution function D. Moreover, I assume that di is private informa-
tion and is observed only by politician i. From now on, I refer to di as to the
type of politician i. Note, that costs are realized only if ti > 0. If ti = 0 then
politician is cost is zero.
I consider the closed voting rule, so the payments are conditioned on the
implementation of the project and not on the individual votes. As a result, the
utility obtained by politician i is:
Ui (di; ti) =
8<: ti   di if the project is implemented and ti > 00 if the project is implemented and ti = 0
p if the project is not implemented
:
(1)
Following Dal Bo (2006), I do not explicitly model the lobbys utility, but
I assume that it decreases in the sum of payments
P
i
ti and increases in the
probability of the projects approval. I further assume that the value of the
project for the lobby is relatively high and that she faces no budget constraint,
so she can credibly commit to large private payments.
5.2.2 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The lobby announces her payments strategy.
2. The politicians announce their types simultaneously.
3. The lobby observes the announcements and proposes payments which are
consistent with her announcement at the rst stage.
4. The voting takes place, the decision is implemented and payments are paid
in a pre-specied way.
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The lobbys strategy includes the structure of the payments as a function
of the announced types of politicians, in particular the number of the coali-
tion members. As I have already mentioned, I dene the players who obtain
a positive private payment as the coalition members. As it is traditional in
the lobbying literature and along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (2001),
I assume that the lobby is able to commit to the proposed payments. On the
contrary, the politiciansannouncements do not need to be true and the politi-
cians cannot commit to any specic voting behavior. The lobbys proposal is
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, so there is no bargaining between the lobby and the
politicians.
5.2.3 Strategies and the equilibrium concept
Feasible action al of the lobby is paymentsvector t
ed 2 <n+, where edi is a
type announcement of player i. I restrict the announcements to the space of
feasible types. Therefore, the feasible action of politician i at the second stage
of the game is the type announcement edi (di; t) 2 [dL; dH ]. The feasible action
of politician i at the voting stage is ai

di; edi; t 2 faccept; rejectg.
Strategy si for player i is a sequence of actions and the strategy prole s is
an (n+ 1)-tuple of strategies, one for each player.
The game is solved by backward induction. The solution concept is subgame
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Since no player can change the outcome if
a proposal is supported by more than a simple majority, I restrict attention to
the equilibria in which weakly dominated strategies are eliminated.
There exist a number of potential strategies for the lobby. The lobby can
always propose the payment equal to p+ dH to a simple majority. Such a pro-
posal will guarantee the project implementation, but it can be quite expensive
for the lobby. The lobby can also propose lower payments to some players and
face a certain risk of the project rejection. The optimal strategy will depend
on the exact form of the lobbys utility function and on the typesdistribution.
In this paper I assume that the lobby is extremely risk averse and strongly
prefers the guaranteed implementation of the project. For that reason, I con-
centrate mainly on the question of whether the lobby can induce politicians to
reveal their true types. Therefore, I restrict the lobby behavior to the following
strategy: she takes the announced types as true types and optimizes over the
number of the coalition members and the coalition payments. The minority
coalition case is trivial, so I consider the minimal winning coalition (MWC) and
the supermajority coalition.
I dene the truth-telling equilibrium in the following way:
Denition 1 The strategy prole is called a truth-telling equilibrium if it
fullls the following conditions:
1. The strategy prole is a subgame-perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2.Politicians believe that all other politicians make truthful announcements.
3. Politicians make truthful announcements: all politicians announce their
true types, edi = di for 8i
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4. The lobby takes the announcements as truthful and proposes private pay-
ments in accordance with that.
5.3 Complete information
As a benchmark, I look at the case where the types of politicians are common
knowledge. Under complete information, the standard result is that the lobby
chooses n+12 politicians with the lowest di and forms the MWC:
Denition 2 The agenda setter forms the MWC if any coalition member is
an element of MWC, where MWC  N is nonempty set which satises
i. jMWCj = n+12
ii. 8 j 2MWC tj(dj) = min
btj(dj) 2 < aj(btj(dj)) = accept	
8 j =2MWC tj = 0
iii. 8l 2MWC and 8k =2MWC : P
j2Cnflg
tj(dj) + tk(dk) 
P
j2C
tj(dj)
where tk = min
btk(dk) 2 < ak  btk(dk) = accept	
According to this denition, each politician is pivotal and the payment to
each coalition member has to equalize the utility from the project implementa-
tion and the coalition membership with the default option12 :
ti   di = p (2)
) ti = p+ di > 0
Note that the payment increases in the politicianstype.
The utility of politician i is:
Ui (di; ti) =
8<: p if the project is implemented and ti > 00 if the project is implemented and ti = 0
p if the project is not implemented
(3)
5.4 Asymmetric information
5.4.1 Coalition formation and voting
Throughout this section and the rest of the paper I assume that di is private
information and only its distribution is common knowledge.
According to Denition 1, the lobbys strategy is as following: at the rst
stage of the game she commits to the number of coalition members, denoted by
c. Afterwards she observes the vector of announcements ed, takes it is as truthful
announcement, and proposes membership in the coalition to c players with the
minimal announcements, in order to minimize the aggregate transfer:
12As it is customary in the literature, I assume that if a politician is indi¤erent, he will vote
for the project.
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Denition 3 The agenda setter forms the following coalition: each coalition
member is an element of C, where C  N is nonempty set which satises
i. jCj = c
ii. 8 j 2 C tj(edi) = minnbtj(edj) 2 < aj(btj(edj)) = accept if edj  djo
8 j =2 C tj(edj) = 0
iii. 8l 2 C and 8k =2 C : P
j2Cnflg
tj(edj) + tk(edk)  P
j2C
tj(edj)
where tk = min
nbtk(edk) 2 < ak btk(edk) = accept if edj  djo
According to Denition 3, the proposed coalition payment to politician i,
ti, makes him indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the proposal if his an-
nouncement type is his true type. Then the payments are similar to the complete
information case: the lobby minimizes coalition costs and the payments are
ti = p+ edi: (4)
In this case the payment does not depend on the politicians real type but
increases in the announced type edi. Then the utility of politician i with type di
who announces type edi is
Ui

di; edi =
8<: p+
edi   di if the project is implemented and ti > 0
0 if the project is implemented and ti = 0
p if the project is not implemented
(5)
As I have mentioned earlier, the lobby announces her strategy to all politi-
cians already in the beginning of the game. Since the lobby is restricted to only
one feasible strategy, throughout the rest of the paper I concentrate only on the
politiciansstrategies. First I introduce some lemmas which describe the voting
behavior of politicians at the last stage of the game and which will be helpful
throughout the paper:
Lemma 1 All opposition members vote against the project.
The proof follows directly from the assumption that 0 < p.
From Lemma 1 the following results follow directly:
Corollary 1 If the coalition is a minority coalition, the project is never
implemented.
Thus, the lobby never forms a minority coalition.
Lemma 2 If the announcement of coalition member i is truthful, then he
votes for the project.
Proof. If the announcement is truthful, then the coalition member is indif-
ferent between the implementation of the project and the default. Hence, by
assumption, he votes for the project (see footnote3).
It follows from (5) that for edi  di ) Ui edi  Ui (di) and edi > di )
Ui
edi > Ui (di). From this result the next lemma follows directly:
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Lemma 3 (i) If coalition member is announced type is higher than the true
one, edi > di, then he votes for the project.
(ii) If coalition member is announced type is lower than the true one, edi < di
then he votes against the project.
Note that these three lemmas fully characterize the politicians voting be-
havior at the last stage of the game.
5.4.2 Minimal winning coalition
In this section I investigate what happens when the lobby forms the MWC.
According to Denition 3, the lobby observes the vector of announcements ed
and proposes membership in the coalition to n+12 players with the minimal
announcements.
The rst result is that if the lobby forms the MWC, she cannot induce the
truth-telling equilibrium:
Proposition 1 Under the MWC, there are no truthful announcements in
the equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to proposition, that there exists an equilibrium
with truthful announcements. Then all politicians announce their true types.
Consider now the politician with true type dH . He either announces his true
type or he can deviate and make an announcement edi < dH . If he is a coalition
member, his minimal utility is p, regardless of his announcement. This is because
all coalition members are pivotal, hence, if any coalition member obtains less
than p as a result of the project implementation, he can always induce the
project rejection and obtain p as default payment. If he is an opposition member,
his payment is 0 because the project is always implemented. It follows that he
will always announce to be dL type in order to increase his chances to be in the
coalition and his announcement will never be truthful.
As a result, there is no truthful announcement in the equilibrium.
Since the MWC is a key prediction of various models for coalition formation,
it may be interesting to investigate what announcements are made if the lobby
forms the MWC:
Proposition 2 If the lobby forms the MWC and proposes payments accord-
ing to (4), then the announcements strategies are equilibrium strategies only
if:
(i) all players announce edL. If politicianstypes are continuous, it is a unique
announcement.
(ii) If politicians types are discrete, then there exists type d such that all
politicians with true type di  d announce edi > di and all politicians with true
type di  dannounce edL.
This proposition implies an even stronger result than just lack of a truthful
announcement: the lobby cannot sort politicians according to their types and
induce an informational announcement where for each two politicians i and jedi > edj , di > dj and edi = edj , di = dj . As a result, if the lobby believes
the announcements and forms the MWC, the probability that the project is
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implemented is equal to zero for a continuous type. For discrete types such
probability would be positive but can be rather small.
5.4.3 Supermajority coalition
In this section I show that the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the lobby forms
the supermajority coalition. In this model, the supermajority comprises n+32 or
more politicians. I consider the case of n+32 coalition members, the minimal
supermajority coalition and I discuss larger coalitions in the next section. There-
fore, according to Denition 3, the lobby observes the vector of announcementsed and proposes membership in the coalition to n+32 players with the minimal an-
nouncements. I assume, for simplicity, that there are only two possible types of
politicians fdL; dHg and the probability of type dH is h. The private payments
are then as follows
tH = p+ dH ; (6)
tL = p+ dL: (7)
The important feature of a supermajority coalition and the main di¤erence
from the MWC is that no coalition member is pivotal. If all but one coalition
member j, announce their true type then the project is implemented, regardless
of the announcement, the private payment and the voting behavior of j. Hence,
if a single player deviates from the truthful announcement strategy, his utility
depends only on his announced and true type and his coalition status, but not
on his voting behavior. Therefore, the minimal utility of the coalition member
depends on the announced type and can be smaller than p, while it is equal to p
under the MWC. This would changes the incentives during the announcement
stage. The question arises if there is a possibility for truth-telling equilibrium
and under what conditions.
The following proposition presents the main result of the paper:
Proposition 3 If the lobby forms a supermajority coalition, the truthful
announcement is an equilibrium strategy if
1  1
a (n; h)

p  dH   dL  (a (n; h)  1) p (8)
where
a (n; h) 
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
:
Proof. At the rst stage of the game the lobby commits to a coalition size
c = n+32 and to private payments (6) and (7). At the last stage of the game all
politicians vote according to Lemmas 1-3.
78
Consider now the second stage of the game. Suppose that all politicians
announce their true types. If player i is of type dL and he announces his true
type, then his expected utility is:
EUi

dL; edL = p+ n 1X
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n 1 k (1  h)k

n+ 3
2 (k + 1)
  1

p;
(9)
and if he deviates and announces type dH , then his expected utility is:
EUi

dL; edH = n+12X
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+ 3  2k
2 (n  k) (p+ dH   dL) :
(10)
If player i is of type dH and he announces his true type, his expected utility is
EUi

dH ; edH = n+12X
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+ 3  2k
2 (n  k) p: (11)
If he deviates
EUi

dH ; edL = (p+ dL   dH)+ (12)
n 1X
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

n+ 3
2 (k + 1)
  1

(p+ dL   dH) :
The truth-telling equilibrium exists if there are no incentives to deviate for both
types, namely
Ui

dL; edL  Ui dL; edH ; (13)
Ui

dH ; edH  Ui dH ; edL ; (14)
or26641 
Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
  1
3775 p+ dL  dH ;
(15)26641 
Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

3775 p+ dL  dH :
(16)
One can rewrite these conditions as
1  1
a (n; h)

p  dH   dL  (a (n; h)  1) p (17)
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where
a (n; h) 
1 Pn 1
k=n+32
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

1  n+32(k+1)

Pn+1
2
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k n+3 2k2(n k)
:
Moreover, for a relevant parameters range (n > 3; 0 < h < 1; p > 0), it can be
shown that
(a (n; h)  1) p >

1  1
a (n; h)

p: (18)
Therefore, for a relevant parameters range, there are always dH and dL such that
conditions (15) and (16) are satised and the truth-telling equilibrium exist13 .
This proposition shows that the truth-telling equilibrium exists when the
di¤erence between dH and dL is considerable, but not extreme. The range of
the parameters for which the truth-telling equilibrium exists is determined by
conditions (15) and (16). The incentive to deviate for type dL is to increase
the private payment in the case of coalition membership, at the expense of the
probability of coalition membership. If the di¤erence between dH and dL is
too large, type dL deviates. Type dH may deviate in order to increase the
coalition membership probability at the expense of the private payment in case
of coalition membership, he will deviate if the di¤erence dH and dL is too small.
For example, the truth-telling equilibrium for n = 7, h = 0:5 and p = 1
exists if the following conditions are satised:
: 542 14 < dH   dL < 1: 184 1:
The following results show how the change in the parameters p, n and h
inuences the likeliness of the existence of the truth-telling equilibrium.
Corollary 2 The range of parameters dH and dL, for which the truth-telling
equilibrium exists, increases in p.
Proof. From (15) and (16) it follows that the range of parameters dH and
dL, for which the truth-telling equilibrium exists, increases in
(a (n; h)  1) 

1  1
a (n; h)

p:
(a (n; h)  1) 

1  1a(n;h)

> 0, therefore it increases in p.
This corollary states that the higher the utility from default policy is, the
higher is the chance that the lobby can implement the truth-telling equilibrium.
13 It is easy to extend this model for more types. Like in a two types case, the truth-
telling equilibrium exists if the distance between types is not too large and not too small.
Unfortunately, the number of the conditions cannot be reduced. The truth-telling equilibrium
exists if for k types k(k   1) conditions are satised.
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The conditions under which the truth-telling equilibrium exists are too com-
plicated to investigate analytically, but numerical simulations provide the fol-
lowing results:
Corollary 3 The range of parameters dH and dL, for which the truth-telling
equilibrium exists increases with n .
This result is represented in Figure 1. Assume that p = 1 and h = 0:5.
The upper line corresponds to the LHS of condition (15) and the lower line to
the LHS of condition (16). Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the
value of dH   dL is between these two lines. With an increase in n the bounds
on dH   dL, implied by conditions (15) and (16), relax considerably upwards
and tighten slightly downwards. The rst e¤ect is dominant, so the total e¤ect
is an increase of the parameter range for which the equilibrium exists.
Figure 1
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As a result, the society or representative political institutions may prefer
to reduce the number of politicians in the decision body in order to prevent
the existence of the truth-telling equilibrium and to reduce the probability of
the project implementation. This result seems counter-intuitive, because it is
usually more expensive to buy the majority in a large decision body. But buying
the winning coalition under truth-telling in a large decision body can still be
cheaper for the lobby than dealing with asymmetric information in a small
decision body. Furthermore, this result contradicts the famous Condorcets jury
theorem which states that the delegation of a decision to a bigger committee
yields better results.
Corollary 4 If the probability for the high type h increases, the condition
under which type dL announces the truth becomes more restrictive and the con-
dition under which type dH announces the truth becomes less restrictive.
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This result is represented in Figure 214 . Assume that n = 51. The upper
line corresponds to the LHS of condition (15) and the lower line to the LHS
of condition (16). Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the value
of dH   dL is between these two lines. With an increase in h the bounds on
dH   dL, implied by conditions (15) and (16), tighten.
Figure 2
10.90.80.70.60.50.40.30.20.1
27.5
25
22.5
20
17.5
15
12.5
10
7.5
5
2.5
0
h
ln(dH-dL)
5.5 Optimal supermajority size
In the previous section I analyzed the minimal supermajority: simple majority
plus one politician. In this section I investigate how many coalition members
the lobby should include into the coalition. Including an additional member
into the coalition is costly for the lobby, and ceteris paribus she will prefer the
minimalsupermajority, with n+32 members. But one also has to consider the
parameter restrictions under which the truth-telling equilibrium exists. If they
change, it can be the case that the supermajority with more than n+32 members
is preferable.
Assume that lobby commits to include n > c  n+52 politicians into the
coalition. Suppose that all politicians announce their true type.
Then the politician with type dL announces his true type if the following
condition is satised:
14For the sake of convenience of the gracal representation I used ln(dH   dL).
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0BB@1 +
Pn 1
k=c
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n 1 k (1  h)k

c
(k+1)   1

Pc 1
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k c k(n k)
  1
1CCA p  dH   dL
(19)
The politician with type dH announces his true type if the following condition
is satised:0BB@1 
Pc 1
k=0
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k c k(n k)
1 +
Pn 1
k=c
(n  1)!
(n  1  k)!k!h
n k 1 (1  h)k

c
(k+1)   1

1CCA p  dH   dL
(20)
Assume that n = 51. Conditions (19) and (20) are represented in Figure 3.
The upper line corresponds to the LHS of condition (19) and the lower line to
the LHS of condition (20). Therefore, the truth-telling equilibrium exists if the
value of dH   dL is between these two lines.
Figure 3
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This example shows that big supermajorities can emerge in the equilibrium.
This will occur if the parameters are such that the truth-telling equilibrium does
not exist for n+32 -members coalition. In this particular example it happens if
dH dL < 1. Inviting additional players into the coalition is costly for the lobby,
but it can still be protable, compared to the situation when the truth-telling
equilibrium cannot be achieved.
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Finally, note that:
Remark 1 If all players are coalition members, they will announce the
highest type. Therefore, there will be no truth-telling equilibrium in this case.
5.6 Continuous distribution
In this section I consider continuous types. I assume that di is distributed
independently on the interval [dL; dH ]. I show that politicians do not announce
their true types, even if a supermajority is formed.
The intuition for the non-existence of truthful announcements is that high
type players expect that they will not be in the coalition with a high probability.
Moreover, the proposal will always be accepted if all players announce their
true types. Hence, the expected utility of the players with high types is close to
zero. This means that it will be protable for some players to deviate from the
truthful announcement and to announce a lower type. Opposite to a discrete
case when the announcement of the lower type implies a considerable change in
the coalition payment (from p to p+ dL  dH) if the types are continuous there
is always announcement ed < dH such that deviation is protable. Two main
di¤erences between discrete and continuous types explain these results. If the
types are discrete, rst, the probability of the coalition participation does not go
to zero even if the true type is maximal. Second, the politician cannot announce
the arbitrary type di   ", he is limited to feasible types. More formally:
Proposition 4 There is no truth-telling equilibrium under the supermajor-
ity coalition, if the types are continuous.
Proof. Assume, contrary to the proposition, that all players announce their
true types and the lobby forms supermajority. At the last stage of the game all
politicians vote according to Lemmas 1-3.
Consider player i: if he announces his true type his expected utility is:
EUi (di; di) = Pi(di; d i)  p+ (1  Pi(di; d i))  0; (21)
where Pi(di; d i) is the probability that player i is a coalition member, which
is a weakly negative function of is announcement.
If a player deviates and announces di   ", then his expected utility is:
EUi

di; edi = Pi(di "; d i)(p+ (di   ")  di)+(1  Pi(di   "; d i))0 (22)
= Pi(di   "; d i)  (p  ") :
If a player with type dH announces his true type then the probability that
he is in the coalition, Pi(dH ; d i), is equal to zero. Hence, his expected utility
is zero as well. Therefore, there always exists such " that
Pi(dH   "; d i)  (p  ") > 0: (23)
As a result, the player with true type dH never announces his true type and
truth-telling cannot be equilibrium strategy.
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This result follows logically from the equilibrium existence conditions (15)
and (16): if the types are continuous, they can never be satised and the lobby
cannot induce the truth-telling equilibrium.
In order to deal with nonexistence of the truth-telling equilibrium, the lobby
can discretize the announcements. namely, she can adopt similar to the Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982) partition strategy. Then the lobby divides announcements
space into intervals and asks players to announce in what intervals they are. The
existence of truthful announcement in Crawford Sobel type equilibrium for this
model can easily be shown.
5.7 Conclusions
This paper presented a model of inuence over the group decision under asym-
metric information. I considered the secret voting, so that the private payments
can be conditioned only on the project implementation. The politician bears
costs if he is associated with the project via the private payments, regardless of
his actual vote.
In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that the supermajority
coalitions are often observed in reality even if the standard theory prediction is
the MWC. Under asymmetric information, by forming supermajority coalition
the lobby can induce the politicians to reveal their true types, if the type space
is discrete. This leads to a sure implementation of a generally undesired project
at a cost close to that of the complete information MWC.
The truth-telling equilibrium exists already for the minimal supermajority:
simple majority plus one politician. The bigger coalition can be formed by
the lobby in spite of the increase in the coalition cost: introducing additional
members into the coalition leads to the existence of the truth-telling equilibrium
for a broader range of parameters.
Adding new politicians to the decision body (an increase in n) relaxes the
conditions for the existence of a truth-telling equilibrium. Therefore, the soci-
ety or representative political institutions may prefer to reduce the number of
politicians in the decision body. This result seems counter-intuitive, because it
is usually more expensive to buy the majority in a large decision body. But
buying the winning coalition under truth-telling in a large decision body can
still be cheaper for the lobby than facing false announcements in a small de-
cision body. Furthermore, this result contradicts the famous Condorcets jury
theorem which states that the delegation of a decision to a bigger committee
yields better results. This result is tested and found to have strong support in
Carrubba and Volden (2004). Carrubba and Volden (2000) predict that coali-
tions are more likely to be oversized when the number and diversity of actors
in a legislative chamber is greater. In order to test this predictions they use the
number of actors in a legislative chamber is measured by the number of seats
and as a function of the number of parties. They state that coalitions will be
more oversized in legislative chambers comprised of more decisive actors.
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A possible extension of the present paper may examine the multidimensional
policy space. It is interesting to investigate if the supermajority coalitions will
be formed in this case as well.
5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that at the last stage of the game all politicians vote according to Lemmas
1-3. Consider politician i, dL  di  dH . If politician i is an opposition member,
his utility is 0 in the case of project implementation and p in the case of project
rejection, regardless of his announcement and the announcement of any other
player. According to Lemma 1, he always votes against the project.
If politician i is a coalition member, his minimal utility is p. This is because
all coalition members are pivotal, hence, if politician i obtains less than p as a
result of the project implementation, he can always induce the project rejection
and obtains p as a default payment. Then it follows from (utility under asym-
metric information), that all announcements edi  di secure the same utility
for coalition member i. Moreover, announcement edi = edL weakly maximizes
the chances to be in the coalition. Thus, in any equilibrium each politician i
announces either edi = edL or edi > di. Hence, a player with true type dH always
announces edL.
Player i, given the expected types and the actions of the other players, faces
the following problem: if he announces edi > di then his expected utility is
EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i = 1  Pc edi; ed ipo ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p+
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p (24)
s:t: edi > di
where ed i is the announcements of all other players, Pc edi; ed i is the prob-
ability that player i is a coalition member, pc
ed i; d i is the probability
of a projects implementation, given that player i is a coalition member and
po
ed i; d i is the probability of a projects implementation given that player
i is an opposition member. Note that if player i is a coalition member, he al-
ways supports the project and if he is an opposition member he votes against
it. Hence, the probabilities of the projects implementation pc
ed i; d i and
po
ed i; d i depend only on actions of other players.
If player i announces edL, then his expected utility is as follows:
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EUi
edL; ed i; d i = Pc edL; ed i p+ (25)
1  Pc
edL; ed ipo ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p
Note that if player i is a coalition member, then the project is not implemented,
because player i votes against it.
Player i maximizes his expected utility over edi, given di and the announce-
ments of the other players. Note, rst, that if the player announces edL then his
expected utility does not depend on his true type. Secondly, if the player is an
opposition member, his expected utility does not depend on his announcement.
Thus I can denote the opposition members expected utility as
C
ed i; d i  po ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p (26)
Player i announces edi > di if and only if
EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i, (27)
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p Pc dL; ed i p+
+

Pc

dL; ed i  Pc edi; ed iC ed i; d i > 0 (28)
The probability to be a coalition member weakly decreases in the announce-
ment. Hence Pc

dL; ed i > Pc edi; ed i, and the third term in inequality (28)
is positive. Therefore, it is enough to prove that the rst two terms are positive
in order to show that politician i announces edi > di:
Pc
edi; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p Pc dL; ed i p > 0
(29)
) EUi
edi; di; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i : (30)
Consider two types di1 > di2. Suppose that for di1 the optimal announce-
ment is edi > di1:
EUi
edi; di1; ed i; d i > EUi edL; ed i; d i : (31)
Then, edi > di1 > di2 and
Pc
edi; ed i pc ed i; d ip+ edi   di1 < Pc edi; ed i pc ed i; d ip+ edi   di2 :
(32)
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Together with (11) it implies
EUi
edi; di1; ed i; d i < EUi edi; di2; ed i; d i (33)
) EUi
edi; di2 > EUi edL; ed i; d i
Hence, if for true type di2, di2 > di1; the player announces edi > di2, then for
true type di1 the announcement is also higher than the true type: edi > di1.
Taking into account that a player with true type dH always announces edL, I
obtain that there are only two possible equilibrium announcement strategies for
player i:
(a) player i always announces edL regardless of his true type.
(b) there is type d such that player i announces edi > di 8di < d and edL
otherwise.
The next step is to show that there is an equilibrium where all politicians
follow the strategy (a) and announce edL. If the project is rejected each player
obtains p. If the project is accepted, all coalition members obtain p and the
opposition members zero. If one player deviates and announces edi > dL, he
stays in opposition. As a result, he obtains a lower payment in the case of
project acceptance and is indi¤erent in the case of project rejection. Hence, all
players will announce edL.
Now I shall argue for discrete types, for some type distributions, there is
an equilibrium where all players follow strategy (b). For example, assume that
there are only two types, dH and dL, and three players. The probability for
type dH is 0.5. Suppose that 0:5p + dL < dH . Then there is an equilibrium
where the players of type dL announce dH and vice versa.
The last step is to show that if the type/announcement space is continues,
then there is no equilibrium where all players follow strategy (b).
Assume that all players follow strategy (b) and announce edi > di 8di < d.
Consider the incentives of player j with true type very close to d. According to
strategy (b) he announces edj > dj . Such player expects that his announcement
is a maximal among all other announcements. Then the expected probability
that he is a coalition member is very close to zero. If politician j is an opposition
member, his utility is 0 in the case of project implementation and p in the case
of project rejection. If politician j is a coalition member, his minimal utility is
p. Then, for all edj > dj , there always exists " such that

po
ed i; d i  0 + 1  po ed i; d i p < 1  Pc edi   "; ed i1  po ed i; d i p+
+Pc
edi   "; ed ipc ed i; d ip+ edi   "  di+ 1  pc ed i; d i p
) EUi
edj ; dj . d; ed i; d i < EUi edj   "; dj ; di; ed i; d i :
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Therefore, player j deviates and announces edj   " in order to improve his
chances to be in the coalition. As a result, strategy (b) cannot be the equi-
librium one. Hence, if the type/announcement space is continuous, the unique
equilibrium is that all politicians announce edL.
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